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economic boom and forced a painful adjustment toward more
sustainable levels of growth. Business opportunities are less
attractive than they were a few years ago, and thus the oil
producing states must work harder to attract foreign expertise and
investment. At the same time, however, Islamic reaction and
general political unrest in the Middle East exert increasing pressure
on these countries to adhere more closely to traditional values as
expressed in their ancient religious law, the Shari'a. Islamic
religious law is designed to regulate not only the religious and
personal life of the devout Muslim but commercial and political
activities as well.' The Shari'a is not well understood in Western
business circles. The application of these ancient legal rules to
complex commercial transactions presents elements of risk and
uncertainty that must be weighed against the potential benefits of
doing business in the area.
Nowhere are these conflicting pressures more evident than in
Saudi Arabia, the West's most important trading partner in the
Middle East and also the most conservative Arab state.2 Saudi
Arabia is now in the process of developing rules for the arbitration
and conciliation of commercial disputes. The task facing the Saudi
government is to give the Western business community confidence
that claims can be settled (reasonably quickly and fairly,
impartially and predictably) under rules at least somewhat familiar
to this community, while not straying too far from the rules that
historically governed arbitration, or tahkim, under the Shari'a.
This Article considers the question of how far the Saudis
can safely go to provide arbitration rules that meet the
requirements of the Western business community while still
remaining faithful to the Saudis' own legal tradition. The Article
initially discusses the various ways that foreigners doing business
in Saudi Arabia may settle disputes and focuses on the newly
promulgated regulations and rules governing arbitration in Saudi
Arabia. It then describes the historical and conceptual differences
between arbitration as it developed in the West, and tahkim as it
developed in the Muslim world. The Article concludes by
I Shari'a means literally "a clear path to water." The definitions of all Arabic
terms used in the text are based on the works on Islamic Law cited in the text and
on my own reading in Arabic legal texts. Two Arabic-English dictionaries were
used: E. LANE, LANE'S ARABIC-ENGLISH LEXICON (1893); H. WEHR & J. COWAN, A
DICTIONARY OF MODERN STANDARD ARABIC (1976).
2 See Saba, Saudi Arabia Investment Climate: Its Risks and Returns, MIDDLE E.
ExEcuTivE REP., Oct. 1986, at 9, 16-19.
[Vol. 24:4906
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss4/3
ISLAMIC LEGAL TRADITION
proposing an alternative approach to extrajudicial resolution of
commercial disputes in Saudi Arabia.
2. THE SAUDI JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ARBITRATION
2.1. The Saudi Judicial System
The judicial system in Saudi Arabia represents an
accommodation between the political power 3 of the King and the
religious authority of the Shari'a and the SharI'a scholars, or
"Ulama".4 The King has the power to appoint judges, to resolve
controversies over disputed points of law, and to promulgate
regulations in the interest of the Muslim community dealing with
areas not treated by the Shari'a.5 The main check on the King's
power is the Shari'a itself, to the extent that it provides clear
answers to legal questions, and the consensus of the Ulama, who
advise the King as to the application of the Shari'a.6
The administration of justice is divided between the Shari'a
3 See S. SOLAIM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION IN SAUDI ARABIA 80-132
(1970); Asherman, Doing Business in Saudi Arabia, 16 INT'L L. 321, 321-37 (1982);
Comment, Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements the Shari'a
to Regulate Development, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 413, 413-53 (1979).
4 Governing law in Saudi Arabia is the Shari'a as interpreted by the school
(madhhab) of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855). The teachings of a later Hanbali
scholar, Taqi Al-Din Abfl AI-'AbbAs Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), are especially
influential in governing circles. The three other recognized schools of law in
Sunni Islam are: the Hanafi school founded by Abfi Hanifa Nu'man Ibn Thabit (d.
767), prevalent today in countries formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, including
Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Eqypt, and Turkey; the Miliki school,
founded by MAlik Ibn Anas Al-AsbAhi (d. 795), influential in the Arabian
Peninsula and Egypt, and prevalent elsewhere in North Africa; and the Shafi'i
school, founded by Muhammad Ibn Idris A1-Shafi'i (d. 819), influential in
Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, prevalent in Pakistan and Indonesia. See S.
MAHMASSANI, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRI' Fi AL-ISLAM 19-39 (F. Ziadeh trans. 1961);
(PHILOSOPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN ISLAM); S. SALEH, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST 4-6 (1984).
5 These powers were outlined by legal counsel representing Saudi Arabia
against the Arabian American Oil Co. ("ARAMCO") in the 1958 Arbitration.
Asherman, supra note 3, at 327.
6 Historically, the most successful Muslim governments have been those that
were able to work most effectively with the religious establishment, thereby
maintaining a sense among the populace that the state was being governed
according to religious principles. The Saudi ruling family has been very effective
at integrating the "Ulami" into the decision-making process in order to insure
political stability while still maintaining a slow but steady pace of change.
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courts and governmental boards. The former are the only courts of
original jurisdiction, but cases that turn primarily on the
interpretation of supplemental regulatory statutes rather than
Shari'a texts are usually referred to the appropriate governmental
board for adjudication.7 Cases headed by a governmental board
include those where the Saudi government is a party as well as
most commercial disputes between private parties where foreign
parties are frequently involved. The governmental boards are
bound to apply the Shari'a as well as the statutes, where
appropriate. The statutes are intended to supplement rather than
modify the Shari'a, and are at least theoretically subordinate to it in
cases of conflict. The boards are made up of both Shari'a court
judges and representatives of government ministries. The Board of
Grievances (Diwdn al-MazAlim) and the Committee for Settlement
of Commercial Disputes (CSCD)8 are the most important boards
7 The statutes are intended to supplement rather than modify the Shari'a, and
are at least theoretically subordinate to it in cases of conflict. However, there is no
record of a Statute being struck down by a court because of incompatibility with
the Shari'a. Occasionally the government will seek a fatwa, or legal opinion, from
the Ulam! regarding the conformity of a proposed statute to Shari'a principles.
Where a statute is ambiguous, the law consulted by the courts is, of course, the
Shari'a. As a practical matter, the proper application of medieval Shari'a
doctrines to modem commercial transactions is often highly debatable, and this
allows the government to claim considerable freedom of action with regard to
commercial legislation.
Nevertheless, the influence of the Sharl'a should not be underestimated by
anyone doing business in Saudi Arabia. A recent example of increased Shari'a
influence involves interest-bearing obligations to banks. Although agreements to
pay interest are contrary to the Shari'a and thus unenforceable, Saudi courts and
administrative bodies have in the past not looked too closely at transactions
where an obligation to pay interest was not obviously apparent. A recent change
of policy has led judicial authorities to place on plaintiffs the obligation of proving
that promissory notes represent a repayment of principal, rather than interest, in
whole or in part. Renton, Saudi Arabia/The Settlement of Banking Disputes: Major
Developments, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., Feb. 1986, at 9, 24-25.
Moreover, Shar'a court judges reportedly have some degree of discretion as
to whether or not to refer a case to a governmental board, leaving some
uncertainty as to what tribunal will decide a particular case. See Vogel, Saudi
Arabia/Decision No. 822 on Banking Deposits: An Analysis, MIDDLE E. EXEcUTIvE REP.,
Apr. 1986, at 9, 21.
8 The Board of Grievances (Diwan al-Mazalim), established in 1955, has
jurisdiction over all disputes in which the Saudi Government or a governmental
agency is a party. The Committee for Settlement of Commercial Disputes (CSCD)
has had jurisdiction since 1967 over disputes involving companies organized
under the Saudi Companies Law. The CSCD consists of three judges, two of
whom are Shari'a court judges, the third being a legal advisor to the Ministry of
Commerce. Most commercial disputes between private parties are now decided
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for litigation involving a foreign business.
Judges of both the Shari'a courts and the governmental boards
have a reputation for fairness and impartiality.9 However, there is
a serious backlog of cases, aggravated by a lack of sophisticated
administrative support, as well as a lack of experience with
complicated international transactions.10 In general, the legal
system has not kept pace with the modernization process. As a
result, foreigners complain that sophisticated financing is difficult
if not impossible and that the security of funds, goods, or
technology advanced to a Saudi entity is inadequate." For
example, there are no clear definitions of liability for, or
enforceability of, insurance or maintenance obligations, patents or
copyrights. Moreover, there is no clear right to repossess goods if a
buyer or lessee defaults; in fact, enforcement is still partly
dependent on who the debtor is.12 These problems have
galvanized the search for an alternative means of dispute
resolution.
2.2. Arbitration and Saudi Arabia
From the early days of oil exploration until the 1950s
arbitration was the primary means of resolving disputes between
Saudi and foreign companies.13 However, the Saudi government's
attitude toward arbitration changed dramatically after the famous
Arabian American Oil Company ("ARAMCO") arbitration of
1958.14 As a result of its dissatisfaction with the decision in that
either by the CSCD or some more specialized government board, such as the
Commercial Papers Committee, which deals with disputes regarding negotiable
instruments, or the legal committee established this year by the Ministry of
Commerce for settlement of disputes between banks and their customers. S.
SOLAIM, supra note 3, at 13341; Renton, supra note 7, at 25 n.1.
9 Cf. S. SOLAIM, supra note 3, at 134-36, 140-41; Comment, supra note 3, at
441-42.
10 Hejailan, National Reports: Saudi Arabia, IV Y.B. COM. ARB. 162, 169 (1979).
1 Saba, supra note 2, at 18-19.
12 See id.
13 For commentary on the arbitration climate in Saudi Arabia prior to 1983,
see generally A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, SAUDI BUSINESS AND LABOR LAW (1982); S.
SALEH, supra note 4, at 290-326; Hejailan, supra note 10, at 162-73.
14 The dispute resulted from a 1954 agreement between Saudi Arabia and
Greek shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis, under which Onassis was granted a
quasi-monopoly to transport oil out of Saudi Arabia. ARAMCO refused to
comply with the Onassis agreement, asserting that it had an absolute right under
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case, the Saudi government in 1963 forbade all government
agencies from resorting to arbitration without prior approval from
the Council of Ministers.15 This policy remains in effect today
despite the 1980 Saudi ratification of the International Convention
for Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Citizens
of Another State (ICSID), which provides for arbitration under the
auspices of the World Bank.16 An ICSID arbitration clause has
never been approved by the Council of Ministers.17 Commercial
its 1933 concession agreement with Saudi Arabia to choose the means for
transportation of oil. ARAMCO's position was upheld by an arbitral tribunal
meeting in Geneva, which applied both Saudi and international law. The Saudi
government's dissatisfaction with the award cannot be adequately explained
merely by the fact that it lost, since the Onassis agreement was not really very
advantageous for Saudi Arabia. The dissatisfaction can perhaps be better
explained by more general Saudi concerns over the ability and willingness of
foreign arbitrators to apply Saudi law to disputes involving Saudi Arabia's most
important natural resource. In any event, Saudi law since the ARAMCO award
has been hostile to arbitration outside of Saudi Arabia or under non-Saudi law.
See State of Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., reprinted in 27 LL.R. 117; Van
den Berg, National Reports: Saudi Arabia, 9 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 7, 15 (1984).
15 A 1963 Council of Ministers resolution forbade government agencies from
(1) designating any foreign law to govern their relations with contracting parties;
(2) accepting arbitration (anywhere) as a method of settling disputes; or (3)
accepting the jurisdiction of any foreign court or other judicial body to the
exclusion of the Saudi Grievance Board. Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58 of
June 25, 1963, reprinted in Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 15 [hereinafter
Resolution]. For a discussion of Resolution No. 58, see Hejailan, supra note 10, at
163.
16 The Saudi government ratified the ICSID Convention on June 7, 1980.
Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6690, 575 U.N.T.S. 160; see Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 15; see also
Chaudhri & Clodfelter, Saudi Arabia: Commercial Arbitration in the Kingdom,
MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., July 1985, at 9.
17 Saudi ratification of ICSID "reserves the right of not submitting all
questions pertaining to oil and pertaining to acts of sovereignty" for arbitration or
conciliation under ICSID. See A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 13, at 181-82. In
recent contract negotiations, Saudi officials refused even to discuss including an
ICSID arbitration clause. Saba, supra note 2, at 19; see also Chaudhri & Clodfelter,
supra note 16, at 20.
Saudi Arabia is not a party to the 1958 New York Convention on Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June 10, 1958, acceded to with
reseruations by United States, Sept. 1, 1970, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6690, 575
U.N.T.S. 38. It is, however, party to the 1952 Inter-Arab Convention on
Enforcement of Judgments and Awards. Convention of the Arab League of Nations
Concerning the Enforcement of Judgments, Sept. 15, 1952, English translation in 1952
REVUE tGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 333-35. This latter convention has
only six signatories and has not been utilized much in practice. See S. SALEH, supra
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arbitration was not governed by a comprehensive set of rules until
1983.18 As a result of this lack of clear procedures and judicial
support, arbitration between private parties has been sporadic. For
example, arbitration rules agreed on by the parties in advance were
not enforced and it was unclear how awards were to be enforced,
especially if they were rendered outside of Saudi Arabia.19 These
note 4, at 418-21.
18 The Saudi Arabia Commercial Court Regulation contained a few limited
rules on arbitration, allowing the court to confirm the appointment of arbitrators
(but not to appoint arbitrators should a party fail to do so) and requiring the court
to review the award prior to enforcement. Saudi Arabia Commercial Court
Regulation, issued under Royal Decree M/32 of 1/15/1350 A.H. (1931 A.D.). These
rules did not recognize the validity of an agreement to submit future disputes
arising from a specific contract to arbitration. Id. The rules were formally
repealed in 1983, but had been seldom utilized for some time prior.
19 Awards rendered outside Saudi Arabia are still notoriously difficult to
enforce in Saudi Arabia. Saba, supra note 2, at 19. Foreign awards must be
embodied in a foreign judgment and even then are subjected. to a de novo review
procedure by the Saudi government and/or a Saudi court of competent
jurisdiction, which will apply Saudi law to the substance of the dispute and
perhaps review factual determinations as well before enforcement is possible.
Naturally, such procedures negate many of the advantages of international
arbitration.
Nonetheless, the arbitration facilities of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) have been utilized on more than 30 occasions since 1975 to settle
business disputes involving Saudi parties. Disputes submitted to arbitration
under the auspices of the ICC or other international bodies have usually been
settled by the parties or resulted in awards that were enforced voluntarily or
enforced in countries other than Saudi Arabia. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J.
PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (1984); A. LERRICK
& Q. MIAN, supra note 13, at 197-99. Aside from the enforcement problem, other
aspects of ICC arbitration are unsatisfactory to both Saudi and foreign
businesspeople. ICC procedures have been criticized as procedurally
cumbersome, time consuming, expensive, and overly confrontational. Saba, supra
note 2, at 19. For an overview and "horror stories" regarding ICC and
international arbitration, see Goekjian, ICC Arbitration From a Practitioner's
Perspective, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 407 (1980); Kerr, International Arbitration
Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. L. 164, 172; Layton, Commentary of International Arbitration as
a Dispute Settlement Vehicle, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., Mar. 1984, at 26; Layton, Is
International Arbitration a Viable Option for Middle East Disputes, MIDDLE E.
EXECUTIVE REP., June 1983, at 14, 15; see also Flower, Killian, Northrup & Range, A
Survey of Arbitral Forums: Their Significance and Procedure, 5 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 219 (1980) thereinafter Flower & Killian]; Goekjian, ICC Arbitration from a
Practitioner's Perspective, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 407 (1980).
From the Saudi perspective, the ICC is viewed as a Western-oriented
institution insufficiently sensitive to Arab legal and business traditions. The
Saudi government is disturbed by the fact that non-Saudi law is frequently
applied in ICC arbitrations to resolve disputes arising in Saudi Arabia out of
relationships created and regulated by Saudi law. See N. ANGELL, PROCEEDINGS OF
SYMPOSIUM ON U.S.-ARAB COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION 8-12 (1984);
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problems were counterbalanced to some degree by the strong
support for arbitration in the Saudi business community, whose
members voluntarily complied with most arbitration awards.
Nonetheless, foreign companies and their legal counsel were
unhappy with the uncertain legal status of arbitration. The Saudi
government was dissatisfied also because arbitrations were
frequently conducted under foreign rules both inside and outside
of Saudi Arabia.20
3. THE ARBITRATION REGULATION OF 1983
The Arbitration Regulation of 1983 ("the Regulation") serves
two important objectives of the Saudi government.21 First, it
provides a comprehensive, uniform set of rules which are
accessible to foreign businesspersons and their legal counsel. The
Regulation is designed to allay their fears over the previous lack of
judicial and legislative support for commercial arbitration.
22
Second, it establishes governmental control not only over
arbitration procedure in general, but over the actual arbitration
proceedings by providing for supervision by governmental
agencies, courts, or perhaps the Chambers of Commerce and
Industry23 ("the Chambers"). The extensive supervisory role
played by the "Authority originally competent to hear the dispute"
("the Authority") is perhaps the feature which differentiates the
Regulation from arbitration laws in other countries.24  The
A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 13, at 197-99.
20 See N. ANGELL, supra note 19, at 8-12; A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 13,
at 197-99.
21 Saudi Arabia Regulation on Arbitration, issued under Royal Decree M/46 of
7/12/1403 A.H. (Apr. 25, 1983 A.D.), reprinted in 9 Y.B. COM. ARB. 316-18 (1984)
(implementing rules issued by Council of Ministers Resolution No. 7 of 8/9/1405
A.H. (May 27, 1985)) [hereinafter Royal Decree M/46]; see also S. SALEH, supra note
4, at 4-6; Allam, Saudi Arabia/Arbitration in the Kingdom: The New Implementation
Rules, MIDDLE E. ExEcuTIvE REP., Aug. 1985, at 9; Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 7-
36. Translations of the Regulation and Rules are also appended to this Article.
22 See Allam, supra note 21, at 9; Chaudhri & Clodfelter, supra note 16, at 9.
23 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, ch. 1, §§ 1-10; see also Allam, supra note
16, at 17.
24 "It distinguishes the Saudi Regulations from the arbitration regulations of
most other countries which seek to set up an entirely self-contained alternative to
the usual recourse to the courts of a particular country." Allam, supra note 21, at
17. "Such ongoing involvement of a court is, of course, quite different from
arbitral supervision in other countries such as France." Chaudhri & Clodfelter,
supra note 16, at 21.
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Authority would presumably be the CSCD in most commercial
disputes;25 the Grievance Board in disputes with a government
agency that has received permission to arbitrate;26 or the competent
Shari'a court in a case involving real estate.27 Representatives of
the Chambers, which promulgated their own arbitration rules in
1980, argue that their organization also should be considered the
Authority in appropriate cases.28 The Saudi government has not
officially commented on the legal status of arbitration under the
auspices of the Chambers since issuing the Regulation.
Three aspects of the procedure established by the Regulation
have caused particular concern among foreign commentators.
29
First, while the Regulation recognizes the validity of a contractual
clause calling for arbitration of future disputes, it is not clear how
such a clause is to be enforced if one party refuses to cooperate
when a dispute arises. Second, commentators are unsure about the
extent to which Saudi law must be applied to the substance of the
dispute. Third, the Regulation does not specify the grounds on
which the Authority may set aside or refuse to execute an award.
3.1. Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses
The Regulation provides for two types of arbitration
agreements: parties may agree either "to arbitrate a specific
existing dispute" or to make a "prior agreement to arbitrate ... any
dispute resulting from the performance of a specific contract."30
This recognition of the validity of an arbitration clause is
confirmed in the Rules of Implementation ("the Rules"). 31 The
binding effect of an arbitration clause is called into question, by the
25 The CSCD is the presumed Authority in this case, although it can be
argued that this is not the sole Authority. As a matter of legal theory, it can be
argued that the Chambers of Commerce and Industry can be considered the
Authority. Allam, supra note 21, at 17.
26 Id.
27 Articles 5 and 6 of the Arbitration Regulation require that an "arbitration
instrument" be filed with the appropriate Saudi Court. Royal Decree M/46, supra
note 21. Where a case is not covered by statutory or contractual provisions,
Shari'a procedural and substantive laws apply to commercial contractual
relationships. Chaudhri & Clodfelter, supra note 16, at 20-21.
28 Royal Decree M/6 of 4/22/1400 A.H. (Mar. 9, 1980 A.D.); see S. SALEH,
supra note 4, at 295-96; Allam, supra note 21, at 18-19.
29 See infra notes 30-53 and accompanying text.
30 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 1.
31 Id. rules of implementation § 6.
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requirement that the parties file an arbitration "document" or
"instrument" (wathiqat al-tahkim) with the Authority for
validation when a dispute arises.32 This instrument must contain
the names of the arbitrator(s) and their acceptance to hear the
dispute and details of the dispute itself, and it must be signed by
both parties.33
It is unclear, however, what happens if a party, having agreed
in advance to arbitration of any disputes arising from a specific
contract, refuses to cooperate in the preparation of an arbitration
instrument when a dispute actually arises. Commentators on the
Regulation and Rules conclude-from the requirement that
disputes subject either to an arbitration clause (future disputes) or
an arbitration instrument -dealing with a specific existing dispute
"be heard only according to the provisions of this Regulation," and
from other Articles which link various time limits and other events,
including the issuance of the award, to the arbitration
instrument-that an arbitration instrument is obligatory in all
cases.34 The Rules appear to confirm the obligatory nature of an
arbitration instrument, distinguishing between an agreement to
arbitrate future disputes (arbitration clause) and the appointment
of arbitrators, which "shall be completed by agreement between
the disputing parties in an arbitration instrument which shall
sufficiently outline the dispute and the names of the arbitrators."35
Commentators have reached different conclusions regarding the
legal effect, by itself, of an agreement to arbitrate future disputes.3
6
32 Id. art. 5.
33 Id.
34 Id. arts. 7, 9, 11,17, 22.
35 Id. rules of implementation § 6.
36 One commentator takes the view that there can be no arbitration on the
basis of an arbitration law, where an arbitration clause is merely a promise to
agree to submit any future dispute to arbitration, although it does have the effect
of staying judicial proceedings. Courts in Lebanon can order a party to sign a
submission agreement, and, if the party refuses, can render judgment on the
merits in favor of the other party. No such sanctions are available in the
Regulation, leading the commentator to term the recognition of arbitration clauses
in Article I "rather platonic," and to argue that it cannot be said with certainty to
constitute more than a definition of an arbitration clause. S. SALEH, supra note 4, at
304-07.
Other commentators argue that provisions of Article 10 stating "[ilf the parties
have not appointed the arbitrators, or if either of them fails to appoint his
arbitrator(s) the Authority... shall appoint the required arbitrators upon request
of the party who is interested in expediting the arbitration" would be meaningless
except in the context of an enforceable arbitration clause, since an arbitration
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Additional confusion is created by the Rules, which state that
an arbitration panel may render a default judgment if one party
does not appear at the first hearing, "as long as the respective
parties have filed their statements of claim, defenses and
documentation." 37 If a party has not cooperated in any stage of the
proceedings, including the filing of such statements, it is unclear
whether a default judgment can still be issued.
This apparent confusion in drafting must be taken seriously by
the Western business community in light of the unenforceability of
arbitration clauses under prior Saudi law and the serious questions
concerning the validity of agreements to arbitrate future disputes
under the Shari'a. At the very least, it is safe to conclude that there
is enough ambiguity in the statute to create opportunities for a
party to delay the proceedings. The Rules state that the Authority
"shall issue a decision for approval of the arbitration instrument
within fifteen days."38 However, the Rules do not state any
consequences if the Authority fails to respect this time limit, which
seems unreasonable (and probably inapplicable) if the arbitration
instrument does not contain all the information required.
Assuming the Authority would have power to appoint an
arbitrator in such a case, the Authority would be required to
provide notice and a hearing on the appointment of arbitrators.39
The party seeking to avoid arbitration would then have a chance to
present arguments regarding the validity of the arbitration clause
and its applicability to the dispute in question, and possibly to
haggle over various aspects of the arbitration instrument, such as
the "details" of the dispute.40
instrument would include the appointment of arbitrators and their acceptance to
serve. Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 11-12.
Still another commentator suggests, on the basis of "informal conversations"
with Saudi government officials, that the proper procedure when a party has
signed an arbitration clause, but refuses to sign an arbitration instrument, would
be for the other party to submit an arbitration instrument containing as much as
possible of the information required in Article 5, coupled with a request that the
Authority exercise its Article 10 power to appoint any missing arbitrators and that
it validate the arbitration instrument at the same time. Allam, supra note 21, at 16,
18 n.10.
37 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, rules of implementation § 18.
3 Id.§7.
39 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 10.
40 Provided there is an arbitration clause that appears valid on its face, most
arbitration rules in widespread use internationally leave more detailed inquiry
into the arbitration clause's validity and applicability, as well as the drafting of
2003]
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3.2. Applicable Law
The Regulation and Rules contain numerous features
apparently designed to insure that arbitrators comply with the
Shari'a and applicable Saudi statutes in deciding the merits of a
case. The Rules specify that arbitrators must be Muslim, though
they need not be Saudi nationals.41 The arbitrators are expected to
issue an award that is valid and enforceable under "provisions of
the Islamic Shari'a and applicable regulations."42 The Authority
acts as secretary to the arbitration panel, handling all "notifications
and notices," and is thus in a position to monitor the proceedings.43
Arbitrators' fees not paid by the parties to the arbitrators within
five days of approval of the arbitration instrument are to be paid to
the Authority and held in escrow. The fees are then payable to the
arbitrators only after the Authority issues an order for execution of
the award.44 This arrangement in itself would seem to be a strong
incentive for arbitrators to make sure that awards comply strictly
with Saudi substantive law so that the Authority's review of the
award will not be unduly prolonged.
One commentator suggests that foreign legal principles might
be applied as long as they are not contrary to Saudi public policy
as expressed in provisions of the Shari'a and the statutes.45 In light
of the aforementioned provisions of the Regulation and Rules and
the difficulty of determining what does or does not constitute
"public policy" in any legal system, it would seem risky for an
arbitrator to disregard a provision of the Shari'a or the statutes on
the basis that such a provision does not rise to the level of public
policy. Public policy is not a term used anywhere in the
Regulation or Rules.
Possible intervention by the Authority after arbitration
proceedings have begun could occur for the purpose of replacing
terms of reference (details of the dispute), to the arbitrators, with possibility of
review by a court or supervisory body after the award is rendered. See generally
Flower & Killian, supra note 19 (comparison of arbitral forums).
41 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, rules of implementation § 3; see also
Allam, supra note 21, at 9, 18 n.3 (theorizing that the government employee need
not be Muslim, though the need for knowledge of Shari'a would make such a
situation unlikely to occur).
42 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, rules of implementation § 39.
43 Id. art. 8.
44 Id. art. 22.
45 Allam, supra note 21, at 9, 15-16.
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arbitrators or hearing challenges to arbitrators.46 Under the Rules,
preliminary issues involving matters outside the jurisdiction of the
arbitration panel, including, but apparently not limited to,
allegations of forgery or other criminal wrongdoing, require that
arbitration proceedings be suspended pending final decision on
the issue by "the concerned authority."
47
3.3. Enforceability of the Award
Once an award is rendered, the Authority is required to hear
an objection against it;48 however, even if there is no objection to
the award, the Regulation still prevents the Authority from issuing
an enforcement order before confirming "that there is nothing to
prevent [the award's] execution legally."49 The word "legally" is a
translation of the Arabic shar'an, which means literally, "according
to the Shari'a." There is nothing in the Regulation or Rules to limit
the scope of review by the Authority. It is not clear whether any
subsequent appeal to a higher authority could be made if an
objection were dismissed by the authority with original
jurisdiction. However, if the Authority is the CSCD, a judgment
would normally be appealable to the Ministry of Commerce.50
This procedure is in marked contrast to the arbitration laws of
other countries that limit the grounds on which a court can deny
execution of an arbitral award.5' Such grounds normally include
lack of impartiality of the arbitrator; failure to give a party a fair
46 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, arts. 10, 12.
47 Id. rules of implementation § 37.
48 Id. art. 19.
49 Id. art. 20.
50 See Allam, supra note 21, at 17 (discussing whether any organization other
than CSCD could constitute the Authority). One can usually file an appeal of a
CSCD decision with the Minister of Commerce, but it is unclear whether such a
procedure is also available for one objecting to a decision by the Authority. See id.
at 19 n.19 ("[T]he Regulations seek to establish a homogeneous and essentially
independent set of Arbitration Regulations and the CSCD is acting itself in an
appellate capacity. It may then be argued that such appeal to the Minister of
Commerce is not available since it is not specifically mentioned in the
Regulations."); see also Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 32.
51 See Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 33. For example, the 1958 New York
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, to
which sixty-six nations (although not Saudi Arabia, see supra note 17) are
contracting states, limits the grounds for refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards.
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, art. V, para. 2, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 3.
2003]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
hearing; an arbitrator exceeding his authority; a violation of some
provision in a statute or in the parties' agreement concerning
arbitration procedure or composition of the arbitral tribunal; or a
violation of public policy.5 2 Usually only one appeal is allowed
from the award in other countries.5 3
4. ARBITRATION AND TAHKIM
As noted above, problems in the arbitration process include:
the ambiguities in the Regulation and Rules regarding the binding
effect of arbitration clauses, the law that may be applied to the
substance of the dispute, and the difference in the scope of judicial
review of arbitration between the West and the Muslim jurists'
interpretation of what they called tahkim. The following sections
discuss why binding arbitration clauses, choice of law by the
parties, and limited judicial review of awards are central to the
Western concept of arbitration and to the usefulness of arbitration
in resolving international business disputes. They then discuss
why these three characteristics may be problematic for a Muslim
jurist. Reference will be made first to the early history of Islam and
the primary sources of the Shari'a (the Qur'An, or revealed word of
God, and the Sunna, or practice of the Prophet Muhammad) and
second to the derived sources of the Shari'a (Qiyas, or analogy to
the revealed sources, and IjmA', or consensus of legal scholars of
the past regarding points of law).
4.1. Arbitration in the Western Legal Tradition
Arbitration in the West has always been a parallel system of
justice operating outside of the existing court system and its rules
of substantive and procedural law. 4 Aristotle emphasized this
distinction very early: "Parties may prefer arbitration rather than a
judicial action, for an arbitrator will look at equity, whilst a court
has to consider the law."55 To fill this equitable role effectively,
arbitration had to be insulated from undue interference by the
52 Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 33.
53 Cf. Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 33 (referring to the stated grounds of
appeal of other countries, and remarking that these countries do not review the
merits of an arbitral award).
54 See R. DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 13 (1985). For
historical data and general observations about national law in the West, see
generally id.
55 See id. at 19 (quoting Aristotle).
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courts, even where court cooperation was needed to insure
enforcement of arbitral decisions. 56  Roman law insulated
arbitration from court interference by confining it to the realm of
contract law and prohibiting court review in most cases.5 7 Late
medieval jurists recognized that minimal court review of awards
was necessary and they severely restricted its scope. 8 Judges were
not permitted to overturn an arbitrator's decision merely because it
was contrary to law (injusta) but only if it was contrary to equity
(iniqua), that is, unacceptable to an honest, reasonable person, such
that it would be contrary to good faith to accept it.59
56 See Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 33 ("In the majority of other countries a
court will not review the merits of an award as arbitration is conceived as a
contractual substitute for litigation. Where parties have expressed the will that
their dispute be solved by arbitration instead of the courts, such will should be
honoured by the courts.").
57 R. DAVID, supra note 54, at 85. Under Roman Law, a dispute could be
submitted to arbitration by a separate agreement, not included in a larger
contract. Such an agreement (arbitration ex compromisso) would not be specifically
enforced by the courts because it was not one of the contractual forms recognized
by law. Courts would, however, enforce an agreement stating that a party who
refused to submit to arbitration or refused to comply with the arbiter's decision
would pay the other party a penalty (poena). The enforcement of such a penalty
did not entail any ruling as to whether or not the arbiter's decision was in
compliance with the law. Another type of arbitration agreement could be
included as a term in a contract. In this way, parties to certain "consensual"
contracts in which a particularly strong duty of good faith (bona fides) was
imposed, could agree to remit the determination of certain clauses in the contract
to an arbitrator. Known as arbitration boni viri, this method could be used, for
example, to determine the sum due a partner in a partnership. Decisions reached
through this type of arbitration would be specifically enforced by a judge, even if
contrary to law. Enforcement would be refused only if the decision was
manifestly unjust, that is, if the arbitrator had not acted in good faith. See id, at 84-
85.
58 Both types of arbitration known to Roman law were revived in the Middle
Ages. Arbitration ex compromisso in particular increasingly assumed the
characteristics of judicial procedure. Certain towns, fairs, merchants' guilds, and
corporations were granted charters that empowered them, among other things, to
organize and administer their own justice. The tribunals thus established were
called arbitral, even though they had compulsory jurisdiction over certain
disputes, partly because parties had a limited ability to choose their own judges,
but primarily because the tribunals did not apply the rules of local customary law;
rather, they developed their own commercial law, the law merchant. Id. at 85-86.
Arbitration boni viri attracted the interest of canon lawyers, who widened its scope
of application by imposing a duty of "good faith" in all contractual relationships.
The arbitrator, also known as an amicabilis compositor, was empowered at first only
to propose a compromise solution acceptable to both parties. Later, however he
was authorized to impose his decision. Id. at 86-87.
59 Id. at 88.
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Although the ancient distinctions between law and equity are
no longer of much practical significance, there has been a
continuing need for dispute resolution procedures that are more
flexible and more closely attuned to business needs than those
applied by national courts. The business community today uses
arbitration for a variety of reasons that one author has recently
summarized under four headings:60
(1) Arbitration is viewed as a means of improving
the administration of justice by reducing the procedural
formalism, delay, and cost inherent in litigation and allowing
disputes to be decided by persons better informed than judges
with regard both to commercial usages in general and to
technical aspects of particular disputes.
(2) Arbitration is viewed as a means for developing
rules of substantive law more appropriate to the needs of the
business community than those applied by courts. The role of
arbitration in developing an international law merchant is
particularly stressed by some authors.61
(3) Arbitration may be an effective method of
finding compromise solutions that take into account the
interests of parties on both sides of a dispute, thus minimizing
resentment and conflict and allowing business relationships to
continue even in circumstances where the parties cannot agree
to a solution of their dispute through conciliation, and where a
court judgment might result in dissolution of the contractual
relationship.
60 See id. at 10-27.
61 See, e.g., Cremades, The Impact of International Arbitratiijn on the Development
of Business Law, 31 AM. J. CoMp. L. 526, 526-34 (1983). For an assessment of the
impact of the international lex mercatoria doctrine, see Klein, The Law to be Applied
by the Arbitrators to the Substance of the Dispute, in THE ART OF ARBirRATION 189-206
a. Schultsz & A. Van den Berg eds. 1982).
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(4) Arbitration may be used to resolve disputes that
do not fall within the jurisdiction of the courts. Arbitrators
may be called upon to revise or modify long-term contracts or
to fill gaps left intentionally or unintentionally by the parties,
thus giving the contract more flexibility to adapt to changed
circumstances that might otherwise result in rescission of the
contract and an award of damages.
National legislation in countries influenced directly or
indirectly by Roman law takes a variety of approaches in
formulating rules that allow arbitration the flexibility to fulfill this
wide range of roles while still permitting access to the courts for
enforcement purposes. Civil law countries tend to maintain a
distinction between two types of arbitration, allowing the parties to
authorize their arbitrator to decide a dispute either in strict law or
ex aequo et bono, in an equitable fashion.62 Different standards of
review may apply depending on which type of arbitration is
chosen.63  In common law countries, no such distinction is
explicitly recognized. 64 However, courts will generally afford great
deference to arbitral decisions, recognizing at least tacitly that
businesspersons do not expect arbitrators to decide disputes in
exactly the same way judges do. In the United States, for example:
[Airbitrators pay the greatest attention to the legal
arguments developed before them, but they do not hesitate
to depart from strict law if this is required by justice. In so
doing they believe they are fulfilling the will of the parties:
businessmen prefer the way in which facts are interpreted
by arbitrators to the uncertainty which, in their opinion, is
62 This distinction in types of arbitration arises from Roman law. R. DAVID,
supra note 54, at 87-88. For an explanation of how the distinction continues in
French law, see id. at 84, 88-90. For a discussion of the distinction's function in
Italian law, see id. at 92.
63 See id. at 87 ("An amicable compositeur was not bound to decide in
accordance with the law, since he was regarded, fundamentally, as a conciliator;
but his decision could be quashed if it were contrary to equity (iniqua). There was
also on the other hand a tendency to... consider... that an abiter ex
compromisso was bound to decide as a judge.").
64 Id. at 107 ("whilst on the continent of Europe a distinction is made between
the arbitrator at law and the amicable compositeur, such a distinction, regarding
substantive law, is unknown in common law countries"). In socialist countries, as
well as in England, only one type of arbitration exists. Id. at 124.
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inherent in the methods of interpretation used by courts or
juries who are ignorant of the problems and conventions of
trade.65
When arbitration has been fettered by rules making it too
similar to litigation, frequently an institutional change has taken
place. In Italy, for example, "free" or "informal" arbitration
(arbitrato liberale) has largely replaced arbitration in strict law
which is governed by provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 66
In England, the Arbitration Act of 197967 severely limits the
authority formerly possessed by the courts to review arbitration
awards on their legal merits, at least where the dispute is of an
international character. The Act was a response to the reluctance
of many businessmen to choose England or English law for
arbitration of complex international disputes.6
8
Judicial deference to the parties' choice of strict law or equity
and deference to the decision of the arbitrator chosen by them, or
at least according to the terms of their agreement, are thus
hallmarks of arbitration in Western countries. A third aspect of
arbitration, namely, the enforceability of agreements to submit
future disputes regarding a specific contract to arbitration rather
than simply specific existing disputes has also gained wide
acceptance since the nineteenth century. It is these aspects of
arbitration that allow the flexibility necessary to assure sufficient
65 See id. at 120. As one commentator has noted,
"American businessmen believe that lawyers and judges are, after all,
amateurs in the matter of commercial disputes. Lawyers and judges
require evidence to be produced on matters which are regarded as self-
evident by a tradesman, they search for a fictive intention and reason on
the assumption that contracting parties have had principally in mind
what would happen if the contract were not duly performed. It is
probably better to have a judicial mind than to be a kleptomaniac or an
habitual drunkard, but this probably brings more trouble to other
people, even if such a turn of mind causes much joy to the man who has
it."
Taeusch, Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies: The Business Man's Opinion,
83 U. PA. L. REV. 147,150 nn. 6-9 (1934).
66 See R. DAVID, supra note 54, at 92-97, 106.
67 Arbitration Act, 1979, 2 Eliz. ch. 2.
68 See Klein, supra note 61, at 198; Clark & Lange, Recent Changes in English
Arbitration Practice Widen Opportunities For More Effective International Arbitrations,
35 Bus. LAW. 1621 (1980).
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sensitivity to the varying needs of business and the expectations of
the parties, while still insuring that arbitration can result in firm
and swift decisions. Arbitration thus resembles both conciliation
and litigation, while not being identical to either one.
4.2. Tahkfm in the Qur'dn and the Sunna69
The history of tahkim in Islam took a markedly different course
from the history of arbitration in the West. In the fragmented,
tribal society of pre-Islamic Arabia, tahkim, unlike arbitration, was
not an alternative to an established judicial system. Rather, it was
the only means of dispute resolution short of war if direct
negotiation and mediation failed to achieve a settlement.
70
Hakams, or arbitrators, were therefore persons of considerable
importance, although they did not hold any political power as a
rule.71 Most hakams were kahins, or soothsayers, whose opinions
would invoke the appropriate deities and would be couched in
terms indicating they were revelations from heaven.72 The general
belief that hakams were divinely inspired was extremely important
in bringing pressure to bear on the parties to submit disputes to
tahkim and to abide by the awards rendered.73
The hakams, therefore, represented a threat to the prophet
Muhammad on two levels. First, they were rival expositors of the
Sunna, or customary law, which Muhammad hoped to reform and
regularize in accordance with his new revelation.74 Second, they
claimed religious authority for themselves and their deities in
competition with the one God, Allah, whom Muhammad
preached. 75 Muhammad's task was to unify the Arabs both
politically and religiously; to become known, in a manner of
speaking, as the hakam and the kahin for a unified nation of Islam,
the sole valid expositor of the Sunna and the sole recipient of
divine revelation.
69 See N. CouLsoN, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1974); J. SCHACHT, AN
INTRODUCrION TO ISLAMIC LAW 6-22 (1964); E. TYAN, HISTORE DE L ORGANISATION
JUDICIARE EN PAYS DE L ISLAM 27-82 (2d ed. 1960).
70 See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 359, 367-70 (M. Khadduri & H. Liebesny
eds. 1955) [hereinafter I LAW IN THE MIDDLE EASTI.
71 See id. at 29; see also J. SCHACHT, supra note 69, at 7.
72 See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 29; see also J. SCHACHT, supra
note 69, at 7-8.
73 See J. SCHACHT, supra note 69, at 8.
74 See id. at 8; see also 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 30-31.
75 See I LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 30.
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Thus, unlike the legal scholars of Rome and medieval Europe,
Muhammad was not at all interested in developing a dispute
resolution mechanism that was insulated from political control. 76
On the contrary, Muhammad needed to control the legal system
and, through it, to control the development of the law itself.77 The
Qur'An particularly stresses the importance of Muhammad being
named hakam in disputes arising among the early Muslims and
that the disputes would be decided in accordance with God's law
as revealed to Muhammad. 78  The Qur'Anic injunction that
believers should be judged "by what God has revealed" precluded
the choice of any other law by the parties.79
Moreover, the very concept of a divinely-revealed law implied
a large potential for error with respect to human judgments. Even
the Prophet himself did not claim infallibility in this regard. A
judgment was binding only insofar as it accorded with God's law.80
It would be sinful for a Muslim to accept a judgment issued by
another that he believed to be contrary to law.8 Yet, as we have
seen, the acceptance of judgments that may be contrary to law is a
fundamental characteristic of what the Westerners call arbitration.
Like choice of law, limited judicial review never became a part of
the Muslim concept of tahkim.82
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that tahkim lost all
of its pre-Islamic characteristics after the rise of Islam, or that it
took on all of the characteristics that a Western lawyer would
76 See J. SCHACHT, supra note 69, at 10-12.
77 See id.
78 "Oh believers! Obey God and obey the Prophet and those among you who
are in authority, and if you have a dispute over anything refer it to God and the
Prophet if you believe in God and the last day. That is the best and fairest
determination." QUR'AN IV:59.
"We have sent you down the Book with the truth that you [Muhammad] may
judge between the people by what God has shown you." Id. IV:105
"Judge between them by what God has revealed and follow not their vain
desires." Id. V:49.
79 The QUR'AN attacks the hakams precisely because they failed to apply the
proper religious and legal principles: "Have you not seen that those who claim to
believe what has been revealed to you and what has been revealed before you
wish to go for judgment to false gods, having been ordered to abjure them?" Id.
IV:60.
80 See M. KHAN, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 6-9 (1978); see also J. SCHACHT, supra
note 69, at 189.
81 See M. KHAN, supra note 80.
82 See 1 LAw IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 259-63.
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associate with a regular court proceeding. Pre-Islamic tahkim was
a voluntary procedure that could be triggered only by the mutual
consent of the parties to the dispute and by their agreement on a
specific individual to act as hakam.83 Muhammad did nothing to
change this voluntary aspect of tahkim.84 He much preferred to
resolve disputes by proposing an amicable settlement (sulh) rather
than by imposing a judgment on an unwilling party.85 A
83 See, e.g., the account in SHAMS AL-DIN AL-SARAKHSl (Hanafi school, d.1090
A.D.), 1 SHARH AL-SIYAR AL-KABIR 363-66 (Hyderabad 1335 A.H.), of a tahkim
between the early Muslims, led by Muhammad, and a Jewish tribe that the
Muslims had besieged. This account is noteworthy because of the great stress
placed on both parties' acceptance of the hakam. According to the account the
Jews agreed to name Muhammad as hakam only on the condition that he refer the
decision of the case to another Muslim named Sa'd Ibn Ma'ddh who had once
been an ally of the Jews. Despite initial agreement on this arrangement, the two
parties nevertheless took solemn oaths, first appointing Muhammad as hakam,
then appointing Sa'd in his place. Even after Sa'd rendered his decision,
Muhammad formally ratified it, saying that it was in accordance with his own
opinion. AL-SARAKHS! explains these procedures as follows:
This is evidence that if they submit to the judgment of a [certain] man
and he refers judgment to a third person with their acceptance, then that
is lawful. He should not refer judgment to a third person without their
acceptance because Sa'd, between the arms of the Prophet (Peace be
upon him), took from them the oath that they would accept [his
judgment], and the Prophet (Peace be upon him) did not object to that.
This is because people have differing opinions [regarding the law] and
this is a judgment that requires an opinion. So their acceptance of the
judgment of one person is not acceptance of the judgment of another,
and if he refers judgment to some one else without their consent and he
judges in a certain way, then that judgment should not be enforced
unless the first hakam approves it after he learns of it. Then it should be
enforced because his approval gives it the same status as if he made it
[himself] and because the judgment was in accordance with his opinion
and they had accepted that.
Id. at 366.
84 See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 30-31.
85 Bukhari's SAHiH (an early collection of traditions) includes a report of a
dispute between two landowners who used the same stream for irrigation. The
plaintiff had the legal right to exclusive use of the stream. The Prophet
nevertheless suggested a reconciliation whereby the defendant could have the use
of any excess water not needed for irrigation of plaintiff's land. Only when the
defendant refused this compromise solution did the prophet give judgment in
accordance with plaintiff's legal right. 3 ABu 'ABDULLAH MUHAMMAD IBN ISMA'IL
AL-BUKHART, SAHIH AL-BUKHAR| bk. XLIX, no. 871 (M. Khan trans. 1979).
Sulh gets far more elaborate treatment than tahkim both in the hadith
literature and in fiqh treatises that followed in later centuries. Bukhari's SAHIH
devotes an entire chapter to sulh, which the Prophet apparently found a
particularly appropriate method for resolving financial disputes. See id. no. 869,
873; see also id. no. 868.
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settlement was a far more likely result where the hakam was
chosen by the parties than where he was imposed by some outside
authority. 6 Early Islam, therefore, never developed a system for
the outside appointment of arbitrators, which is essential to
enforcement of any agreement to submit future disputes to
arbitration.87
When the parties were unable to agree on a single person to act
as hakam, the general practice in the early Islamic community was
for each side to appoint one hakam.88 The two appointed hakams
had to agree on the final judgment. This was the practice used in
the disastrous tahkm that occurred twenty-seven years after
Muhammad's death. The tahkum was an attempt to end the civil
war between 'Ali, the fourth Caliph, and his rival Mu'awiya, the
governor of Syria.89 Accounts of this event also provide a good
illustration of the other aspect of pre-Islamic tahkim that has been
discussed; the emphasis on strict law as contained in the Qur'dn
and the Sunna which provide grounds to set aside a judgment.90
The dispute over the Caliphate was submitted to tahkim by a
written agreement appointing the two hakams. The agreement
gave the hakams full power to settle the dispute, but it contained
an important proviso; the decision had to be based on the Qur'An
and the Sunna.91 The hakams agreed in private that both claimants
be deposed and a new Caliph be chosen by popular election.92
'Ali's hakam announced the decision first, but when Mu'dwiya's
hakam followed, he said he agreed that 'Ali should be deposed but
affirmed Mu'awiya's claim to the Caliphate.93  'Ali quickly
condemned the decision, charging that the two hakams had "left
86 See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 29.
87 See generally M. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 231-38
(1955) (discussing the rise and fall of arbitration in relation to the development of
Islam).
88 The only passage in the QUR'AN that refers to tahkim by anyone except the
Prophet himself, which is also the only passage that talks about tahkim
procedures, shows the purpose of tahkim to be that of reaching a reconciliation
between husband and wife: "If you fear a breach between the two, send a hakam
from his family and a hakam from her family. If they wish a reconciliation, God
will make them agree." QUR'AN IV:35.
89 See M. KHADDURI, supra note 87, at 234-38.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 235.
92 Id. at 236.
93 Id. at 237.
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the Qur'an behind them.. .and that each one had followed his own
opinion without [taking into consideration] a standard. Their
decision [therefore] has no ground of evidence or precedent; and
[moreover] they have disagreed on their decision."94
Thus, all of the principal aspects of early Islamic tahkim
combined to make the decision unenforceable. The requirement
that the parties agree on the choice of a hakam and the general
emphasis on compromise resulted in the appointment of two
arbitrators, thereby reducing the chance of reaching a firm decision
on the dispute. It also created an opportunity for Mu'dwiya's
hakam to outwit 'Ali's hakam. The decision was easily rejected on
grounds that the arbitrators did not comply with Shari'a. The
failure of this tahkim caused innumerable difficulties for the early
Muslim community; it lead indirectly, after 'Ali's assassination, to
the great split between the followers of the Sunna and the
followers of the Shi'a, or party of 'AlL.
Mu'5wiya went on to become the first Caliph of the new
Ummayad dynasty which established a new system of justice
featuring judges, or qddis, with mandatory jurisdiction to hear
disputes and the authority to enforce and execute their
judgments.95 The importance of tahkim greatly declined as a
result. Furthermore, as discussed in the next section,96 the
voluntary character of tahkim increased because there was now an
alternative method of submitting a dispute to the judgment of God
and his Prophet.97 The enforcement of decisions made by hakams
became even more difficult, since they had to be reviewed by qddis
before being enforced.98 Therefore, tahkim became a very different
institution from arbitration as it is known in the West.
4.3. Tahkfm in the Fully-Developed Islamic Legal System99
In discussing the rules developed by the medieval scholars of
fiqh (jurisprudence) regarding tahkim, reference will be made to
the doctrines of all four schools of law recognized by Sunni, or
94 Id.
95 See id. at 242; see also J. SCHACHT, supra note 69, at 188-91.
96 See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
97 See J. SCHACHT, supra note 69, at 10-11, 24-27.
98 See id. at 189.
99 For an excellent, detailed account of tahkim in the fully developed Shari'a
system, see generally S. SALEH, supra note 4.
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orthodox, Islam.100 Although the Hannibali school is of primary
importance in Saudi Arabia, there is a tendency there, as in other
Muslim countries that apply the Shari'a in whole or in part, for
legislators and judges to choose the legal principles from the
doctrines of all four schools considered most appropriate to
contemporary circumstances.' 01 A doctrine recognized by one of
the schools would never be considered heretical or sinful by the
other schools, even if they disagreed with it. Furthermore, in
discussing tahkim, scholars in each of the four schools tend to
emphasize different aspects of the procedure, and thus it is really
not possible to discuss tahkim fully by referring to the doctrine of
only one school. This section is intended to give the reader some
sense of the range of source material available to the Saudi
government for formulating arbitration rules that are consistent
with the Shari'a, broadly defined.
Tahkim is not discussed at all in many of the medieval Shari'a
treatises. Where it is discussed, it is usually allotted only a short
section in the chapter on judicial procedure (Al-Qada'). Although
authors frequently drew analogies between tahkim and contract
law, especially the law of agency (wikala), tahkim was not
classified as part of the law of contract.102 Shari'a scholars were
very careful not to compromise or modify either contractual or
procedural doctrines in their discussion of tahkim. The agreement
to submit a dispute to tahkum had to follow the same rules as an
agency contract. The decision of a hakam had to measure up to the
100 See supra note 4.
101 See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
102 Agency, like other contracts recognized by the Shari'a, was governed by
its own specific rules that the parties had only a limited ability to modify. Agency
and partnership contracts created a special type of relationship that was neither
binding (ldzim) nor void (b~til) but merely permissible (ja'iz). This meant that
both parties had a unilateral right to withdraw from the contract whenever they
wished. In the Gulf states, this aspect of agency agreements has created
difficulties for foreigners doing business in the area, who are often required to
have a local agent (wakil). If the agent withdraws, the foreign principal cannot
legally continue to do business. Applied to tahkim, the analogy with agency
meant that the hakam, as agent of both parties, had jurisdiction only so long as the
parties agreed that he did, and so long as he himself agreed to serve. Like any
other agent, when he transacted the business that he was hired to transact, in this
case the rendering of a judgment that settled the dispute between the parties, his
action was binding on his principal(s) if they had not revoked the agency
agreement. See N. COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN GULF STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL
TRADITION 76-82 (1984). The analogy between tahkim and agency is stressed in all
of the medieval Arabic works cited in this Section.
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same standards as a qddi's judgment. The result was a procedure
which looks to a Western lawyer-like conciliation up to a certain
point, where it then begins to resemble litigation.
The process commenced with the appointment of an arbitrator
(hakam or muhakkam) by the parties to an existing dispute.
Agreements to arbitrate future disputes regarding a specified
contract were unknown in the Middle Ages and thus are not
discussed in the Shari'a texts. In the Shfi'i, Hanafi, and Hanbali
schools, the appointment of the hakam could be revoked by either
party to the dispute or by the hakam himself at any time up until
he announced his decision. 0 3 According to Maliki texts, the
hakam's appointment was irrevocable from the time he was
appointed. 0 4 None of the schools recognized any power in a third
party, not even a qadi, to appoint a hakam who was not accepted
by both parties. Thus, even in the Maliki school, a hakam who
died or otherwise became unable or unfit to serve after being
appointed could not be replaced except by mutual agreement of
the parties.
The problem of revocability of the hakam could be resolved by
having his appointment ratified by a qadi. The hakam would then
become the n'ib, or representative, of the qadi, who was himself a
nd'ib serving at the pleasure of the supreme executive and judicial
authority, the Sultn.105 This rule appears to be universal among
all of the four schools. 06 It is at the root of the requirement in
Article 5 of the Arbitration Regulation of 1983107 and in the old
Commercial Court Rules on arbitration 108 that a judicial authority
103 See, e.g., 5 MUHAMMAD IBN 'UMAN IBN 'ABIDIN (Hanafi school, d.1836),
HASHiYYAT RADD AL-MUHTAR 'ALA AL-DURR AL-MUKHTAR 427432 (1966)
[hereinafter IBN 'ABIDIN]; MUHi AL-DIN ABO ZAKARIYYA NAWAWII (Shafi'i school,
d.1277), MINHAJ AL-TALIBIN (E. Howard trans. 1914); 10 MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN IBN
QUDAMA (Hanbali school, d.1223), AL-MUGHNI (1969) [hereinafter IBN QUDAMA].
104 See, e.g., BURHAN AL-DIN IBRAHIM IBN 'ALl IBN FARHON (Maliki school,
d.1397), TABSIRAT AL-HUKKAM Fl USUL AL-AQDIYYA nos. 43-44 (Cairo 1301 A.H.)
[hereinafter IBN FARHON].
105 See the MAJALLA art. 1847 (C. Typer, D. Demetriades & 1. Effendi trans.
1901). The MAJALLA is a nineteenth century Ottoman codification of commercial
doctrines of the Hanafi School. For more information on the ability of the Q~di to
delegate his powers, see Tyan, Judicial Organization, in 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
supra note 70, at 236-41.
106 See S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 43.
107 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 5.
108 Royal Decree M/11 of 1328 A.H. (1962), amended by Royal Decree M/5 of
1389 A.H. (1969) & Royal Decree M/8 of 1393 A.H. (1973).
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must ratify the appointment of arbitrators. What this doctrine did
not provide was a way for a court or any other body to appoint a
hakam not initially chosen by both parties, or any other way to
make tahkim compulsory prior to the appointment of a hakam.109
This being the case, a clause in a contract referring future disputes
to arbitration would seem to be unenforceable. 110 In all of the
109 Shari'a sources do provide two exceptions to the rule that only the parties
may choose arbitrators. The first and most important of these is found in accounts
of the Mazdlim, or grievances, procedure. This procedure was a direct application
of the absolute authority of the sovereign to right all wrongs. Ideally, grievances
were to be heard directly by the king, but the power was usually delegated to
subordinates who could act as a sort of "super" appellate court having power not
only to review and overturn judgments and other formal acts by qadis and
administrative officials, but also to look into all aspects of those officials' public
and even private conduct, to determine their worthiness and competence for their
position. Mazalim powers could also be used to enforce judgments against
powerful persons that qadis were unable or unwilling to enforce. Mazalim
officials were never called qadis, and were freed from nearly all Shari'a rules of
procedure and evidence. Unlike a q~di, an official exercising mazalim powers
could compel parties to submit to a procedure similar to tahkim, though it is
never called by that name in the sources. Rather, it is reported that a mazdlim
official, after conducting an investigation of the dispute, could refer parties to
"mediation" (wasdta) by persons chosen by the official. Should mediation fail to
result in an amicable settlement (sulh), the case would be decided by a qddi also
chosen by the mazalim official. It is not clear whether the qidi could also be a
mediator. ABO AL HASSAN AL-MAWARDII, AL-AHKAM AL-SULTANIYYA 77 passim
(1973); 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 266; see also id. at 263-69
(discussing maz~lim as a type of justice "superior" to the ordinary judiciary,
whose authority emanated from the authority of the sovereign, and who is not
bound by positive law).
The second exception stems from the comparative latitude afforded by jurists
of the Hanbali school to freedom of contract in general and freedom of contract in
territory not under Muslim control (Dar al-Harb) in particular. Contracts made
under a foreign law regulating transactions taking place substantially outside
Muslim territory (dr al-Islim) should be recognized as valid under Hanbali
doctrine. 9 IBN QUDAMA, supra note 103, at 245, 273; S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 89;
A. ZAYDAN, AHKAM AL-DHIMMIYYIN WA'L MUSTA'MININ F! DAR AL-ISLAM 560-63
(1963). This doctrine could perhaps cause a Hanbali court to honor an arbitration
clause in such a contract. The doctrine would probably not cause a court to
enforce a foreign arbitral award based on legal principles not consistent with the
Shari'a, since the award would be considered an act of judicial sovereignty in
contrast with the contractual character of the arbitration clause. This
identification of an arbitral award with the law of judgments and an arbitration
agreement with the law of contract would be consistent with the Shari'a's basic
approach to tahkim. S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 89 n.19, 91-92, 320-22.
110 A Lebanese commentator has cited other reasons why an arbitration
clause would be invalid under the Shari'a based on Shari'a general hostility to
agreements dependent on unforeseeable, future events. This hostility stems from
QUR'ANic prohibitions of rib5' (usury) and maysir (gambling), which merged in
the minds of the Shari'a scholars to create a strong presumption against undue
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss4/3
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schools, the parties' acceptance of a specific person or persons to
act as hakam appeared to be an essential aspect of tahkim, one of
the characteristics that defined the term. It is this very requirement
of submitting an agreement signed by both parties at the time the
dispute arises that calls into question the enforceability of an
agreement to arbitrate future disputes (arbitration clause) under
the Regulation."'
The analogy between tahkiun and agency is central to
understanding how the medieval Hanafi, Shaft'!, and Hanbali
risk (gharar) in transactions. Gharar was said to result from lack of knowledge of
the subject matter of the contract, its quality or quantity, the amount due in
exchange, or the time payment or performance is due, which could lead to an
undue profit for one party at the expense of the other. This uncompensated profit
was the evil thought to be at the root of the prohibitions of riba' and maysir. The
longer contractual obligations continue into the future, and the more conditional
or indefinite they are, the greater the risk that one party will not receive the value
that he expected at the time the contract was made. The Shari'a did not recognize
an agreement in futuro, an agreement to agree, which is essentially what an
arbitration clause amounts to. Furthermore, the Shari'a did not recognize the
validity of contracts whose object or purpose was not in existence or at least
capable of being accomplished at the time of contracting. If the object or purpose
of an arbitration agreement is the settlement of a dispute, then the fact that there is
no dispute would be grounds for annulment of the contract, or at the very least
would make the contract revocable by either party. Finally, the Maliki and
Hanbali schools flatly refuse to recognize the validity of a contract that is
"suspended" (al 'aqd al-mawqafffi haqqihi); in other words, a contract that becomes
enforceable only on the occurrence of some uncertain, future event. Arbitration
contracts are among the few contracts that cannot be conditional, according to the
Shari'a and Hanafi schools. In other words, the terms of an arbitration agreement
are defined by law. S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 48-50; see also N. COULSON, supra note
102, at 44; IBN'ABIDiN, supra note 103, at 428; IBN QUDAMA, supra note 102, at 95; S.
MAHMASSANI, AL-NAZARIYYA AL-'AMMA LI'L-MJIBAT WA'L-'UQOD FI'L-SHARI'A AL-
ISLAMIYYA 327-29 (1972).
The concern over uncertainty and lack of foreseeability also explains the
revocability of the permissible (d'iz) contracts of partnership and agency. Such
contracts, though necessary elements of an effective commercial system, are
inherently uncertain because they are especially dependent on continued personal
contact and cooperation between the parties. Thus, they could neither be
considered void nor unconditionally binding but as belonging in a special
category. N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 76-82.
111 Egyptian law on arbitration provides an ingenious, if problematic,
solution. Parties are required to name specific persons as arbitrators in the
arbitration clause, in advance of any dispute, and obtain their consent to serve. A
court will then ratify the arbitration clause. The problem is that if an arbitrator is
unable to serve at the time a dispute arises, or is disqualified, the arbitration
collapses unless the parties can agree at that time on the appointment of a
replacement. S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 201 passim. Note that Article 10 of the
Regulation, allowing the Authority to appoint arbitrators, is a clear departure
from the Shari'a. Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 10.
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scholars viewed the tahkim procedure. It seems clear that tahkim
was intended to begin with an attempt at conciliation (sulh), which
due to its association with religious generosity and forgiveness,
was the preferred method of dispute resolution. While attempting
conciliation, it was apparently considered desirable for the hakam
to be put on an equal or even inferior level to the parties in order to
force him to persuade rather than coerce the parties and generally
to maintain a cooperative and friendly atmosphere conducive to an
amicable settlement, the same atmosphere that ought to be
maintained between principal and agent.
Incentives to settle rather than litigate were built into the
tahkim system. Since an offense against the law was also an
offense against religion, the very idea that a person might have to
be dragged into court and forced to obey the law was shameful.
Even a successful litigant could suffer damage to his reputation.11 2
It was far preferable to settle, perhaps on the basis of a private legal
opinion from a mufti (legal scholar), or to submit voluntarily to the
judgment of a hakam.113 It is a general rule in all schools of the
Shari'a as well as in the statute laws of most modem Arab states
that disputes that cannot be conciliated cannot be arbitrated." 4
Thus, the possibility of conciliation must always remain open in
tahkn.
At some point during the tahkim procedure the hakam
changed from a conciliator whose actions were governed by the
law of contract to a judge whose decision had to comply with the
rules of procedure, evidence, and substantive law under the
Shari'a. The hakam therefore had to have the qualifications of a
qddi."5 There are seven such qualifications, the most important of
which is that he be a Muslim, and knowledgeable in the science of
112 See 4 IBN QUDAMA, supra note 103, at 358.
113 According to an Egyptian scholar, both tahkum and ifta' (the practice of
seeking legal opinions) were intended to give parties an opportunity "to know the
judgment of the Shari'a and adhere to its precepts obediently and voluntarily."
M. MADKUR, AL-QADA' Fl AL-ISLAM 131 (1965).
114 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 2.
115 This rule is universal, except among some very late Hanafi scholars. The
MAJALLA, for example does not state anywhere that a hakam has to be a Muslim.
See the MAJALLA, supra note 105. Hanbali sources insist that a hakam be "qualified
to give judgment [salih l'il-qada']". See MANSOR IBN YONUs AL-BUHTI! (Hanbali
school, d. 1641); AL-BuHOTi, 6 KASHSHAF AL-QINA' 'AN MATN AL-IQNA' 308-09
(1968) [hereinafter AL-BUHOTI]; MUSTAFA IBN SA'D AL-SUYUTi (Hanbali school, d.
circa 18th c.), 6 MATALIB ULA AL-NUHA Fl SHARH GHAYAT AL-MUNTAHA (1961)
[hereinafter AL-SUYOTi]; 10 IBN QUDAMA, supra note 103, at 94.
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fiqh, or Shari'a jurisprudence. 116 If all parties to the dispute were
non-Muslims these rules did not apply. Non-Muslims residing
permanently in Muslim territory (dhimmis), or traveling under a
grant of safe conduct were permitted to administer their own
justice if the dispute was between parties of the same religion. If
their religions differed, or if a Muslim party were involved,
application of the Shari'a was mandatory. 117 Thus, if a Muslim was
a party to the dispute, it was not possible to arbitrate except in
strict law. 18 Choice of law between the Shari'a schools was
possible by the parties' agreement to choose a hakam from that
particular school.
The areas of most serious conflict between Western and Islamic
concepts of arbitration concern the enforceability of a judgment
reached through tahkim and the standard of review applied. The
differences stem from the fundamental nature of law in Islam. The
Shari'a, for a devout Muslim, is something of a religious ideal,
ultimately beyond the comprehension of mortals. The Prophet
expressed this attitude in a well-known hadith:
I am only a man, and when you come pleading before me it
may happen that one of you might be more eloquent in his
pleadings and that as a result I adjudicate in his favor
according to this speech. If it so happens and I give an
advantage to one of you by granting him a thing which
belongs to his opponent, he had better not take it because I
would be giving him a portion of Hell.119
This remarkable statement brings out two important aspects of
Islamic Law. It underscores the fallibility of all human judgments
when measured against a divinely revealed standard, while
warning believers not to act against their own consciences. A
judgment may put an end to litigation, but it does not change the
essence of things. For a reviewing court to enforce what it believed
to be a serious violation or misinterpretation of the law would
116 S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 35-38.
117 A. FARRAL, LE STATUT UGAL DES NONMUSULMANS EN PAYS D'ISLAM 344-66
(1958); A. ZAYDAN, supra note 109, at 560; 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70,
at 78-124.
118 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, Hakam 72 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter
ENCYCLOPEDIA].
119 IMAM MUSLIM, 3 SAHIH MUSLIM no. 4721 (A. Siddiqi trans. 1976).
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itself be sinful, equivalent to a successful litigant taking advantage
of a favorable judgment that he knows to be unjust120
The schools of law differed somewhat on the binding force of a
judgment reached through tahkim. A minority of Shafi'i scholars
held that the final judgment had to be accepted by both parties
before it became binding on them, thus reducing tahkim to a
purely conciliatory procedure from beginning to end.'2' Hanafi
scholars held that a qadi should not enforce a hakam's judgment
unless he agreed with it.122 The majority of the ShWfi'i scholars as
well as the Maliki and Hanbali schools were of the opinion that the
decision of a hakam had the same legal status as a qidi's
judgment.123 The Hanbalis are particularly insistent on this point,
stating that a qadi should not refuse enforcement merely because
of a difference of opinion (ikhtilaf al-r5'y).l 24
This doctrine sounds rather encouraging from a Western
standpoint. However, it did not mean that any legal opinion
expressed in a hakam's judgment was binding on a qadi. The
deference afforded to a hakam's opinion was no greater than
would be afforded to the opinion of another qddi. Such deference
did not extend to a violation or misinterpretation of any rule
stemming directly or by clear analogy (qiyds jali) from the primary
sources of the Shari'a, the Qur'dn, and the Sunna, or any rule on
which there was a consensus (Ijmd') among the four schools.
Different views were expressed as to whether a judgment could be
revoked or annulled if a qddi or hakam disregarded a rule of law
on which there was a consensus within his own school, in favor of
a rule recognized by another school. In all cases, a qadi or hakam
was expected to be aware of any controversy, at least within his
own school, regarding a rule on which he was basing his
judgment. If he failed to cite an opinion contesting the rule he
120 Another well-known tradition warns against "making lawful what is
unlawful" or "making unlawful what is lawful." (Ld yuhill hardman wa-ld yuharrim
haldlan). See Tyan, L'Autoriti de la Chose Jugde en Droit Musulman, 1962 STUDIA
ISLAMICA 81,81-90.
121 SHAMS AL-DiN RAML (Shafi'i school, d. 1596 A.D.), 8 NIHAYAT AL-MUHTAJ
230-31 (Cairo 1356 A.H.) [hereinafter RAMI]; S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 75;
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 118, at 72.
122 IBN 'ABIDIN, supra note 103, at 431.
123 IBN FARHON, supra note 104, no. 44 (Ma1iki school); RAMLl, supra note 121
(Shafi'i school).
124 AL-BuHOtrI, supra note 115, at 310; 6 AL-SuYOrr, supra note 115, at 472; 10
IBN QUDAMA, supra note 103, at 95.
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applied, the door would be left open for a reviewing court to
revoke or annul the judgment based on such other opinion. 25
These rules would seem to make these judgments of a qadI or
hakam extremely precarious. As a practical matter, however, since
there was no appellate court system as such in medieval Islamic
society and since a qadi had the power to enforce his own
judgments, most were relatively stable.126 A hakam, however, had
no power to enforce his decision. The decision would therefore
have to be reviewed by the local q~di if the parties did not comply
with it voluntarily. As a general rule, judgments could not be
revoked or annulled because of a mere error of fact.127
In conclusion, the basic conceptual differences between
arbitration and tahkim may be summarized as follows. First,
arbitration in the West, although it begins with a contract, takes on
many of the procedural characteristics of a court proceeding in its
earliest stages. In the name of expediency, control by the parties
over arbitration is limited following their initial agreement to
arbitrate. 28 From then on, the procedure itself takes over, insuring
that arbitrators will be appointed, preferably but not necessarily by
the parties, and that arbitration will in fact take place unless both
parties agree that it will not. 29 Tahkim, on the other hand,
125 M. MADKUR, supra note 113, at 57-61; see S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 75-82.
126 A q~di's decision would only be reviewed in four circumstances: (1) it
could be reviewed by the qadi who made it; (2) it could be reviewed by his
successor in office; (3) if enforcement were sought in another qAdi's jurisdiction it
could be reviewed by that qadi; or (4) it could be appealed to the sovereign
through the mazalim procedure. See S. SALEN, supra note 4, at 75-82.
127 However, certain Miki authors held that a judgment was reversible for
an error of fact leading to a flagrant injustice, especially if there was reason to
suppose the qadi or hakam had been unduly biased in favor of one party. There
was no limit to the grounds on which an official exercising mazdlim powers might
revoke or annul a judgment. This was in keeping with the extraordinary nature of
the mazalim jurisdiction, which was considered a direct application of the
authority of the sovereign, the source of all judicial power exercised by the qidis.
Id.
128 See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248
(9th Cir. 1973) (basic purpose of arbitration is speedy disposition of disputes
without expense and delay of litigation); see also AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1928) ("The arbitrator is the judge of both fact and law. This
means that the decision and means of arriving at it are not subject to review by
courts ....").
129 Under the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), if the
parties are unable to agree upon an arbitrator and have agreed upon no other
method of choosing one, the AAA will select one for them. See Commercial
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maintains a voluntary, conciliatory, and contractual aspect. The
continuing consent of the parties would ideally be maintained up
to the last possible moment before the hakam renders his decision.
Thus, although certain procedures developed out of necessity to
insure that a hakam, once appointed, could have a chance to
render a decision, the idea of binding the parties to arbitrate a
future dispute is essentially foreign to the cooperative spirit tahkim
was designed to foster.
Second, though she has many of the powers of a judge, an
arbitrator is not bound by the same constraints as a judge. Because
she neither derives her powers from the state nor adjudicates in the
name of the state, she is less interested in furthering the policies
underlying state laws than she is in the needs and expectations of
the parties and of the business community in general. She is
considered particularly well qualified to determine those needs
and expectations, and thus her decision is reviewable only on very
narrow grounds.130  In contrast, when the hakam makes a
judgment he is establishing the rights and duties of one party as
against another under law which is the embodiment of God's
commands for the welfare and protection of His community. The
hakam's primary duty is to the law itself and to the Muslim
community, not to the individual disputing parties. His function is
therefore essentially equivalent to that of a judge, and his decision
is entitled to no more deference than that of a judge.
At the root of the conceptual conflict between the two
procedures is the fact that Islamic Law never developed a
distinction between law and equity. 131 If one believes that the law
is divinely inspired, the very idea that an alternative kind of justice
exists that is more "just" in certain cases than the law itself is
untenable. Thus, disputes must be resolved either by agreement
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association § 12 (1973), reprinted in G.
GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 131 (1977); see also
Global Maritime Leasing Panama, Inc. v. M/S N. Breeze, 349 F. Supp. 779 (D.R.I.
1972) (arbitration agreements are enforceable as any other contract).
13o See, e.g., Sterling Col. Beef Co. V. United Food and Commercial Workers
Local Union No. 7, 767 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1985) (review of arbitration award
confined to narrow question of whether it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement).
131 "Juristic speculation in classical times was not regarded as an independent
process which created a field of man-made law alongside the divine ordinances.
It was entirely subordinate to the divine will in the sense that its function was to
seek the comprehension and the implementation of the purposes of Allah for
Muslim society." N. COULsoN, supra note 102, at 19.
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among the parties or according to the law. It is the end that
determines the means used to achieve it. Therefore, unlike
arbitration, tahkim never developed an identity separate from
conciliation and litigation.
4.4. Significance of the Distinction Between Arbitration and Tahkim
Of what concern is this history to a foreigner trying to do
business in Saudi Arabia? The short answer is that the concerns of
those who promulgate laws regulating business activities must
also be the concerns of the businesspersons themselves. The role of
the Shari'a in Saudi law is defined in the Organic Instructions of
the Kingdom of Hijaz, which have served as sort of an informal
Saudi constitution since they were promulgated by King 'Abd al
'Aziz in 1926:
Article Five. The administration of the HijAzi Kingdom is
in the hands of His Majesty King 'Abd al 'Aziz the First Ibn
'Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al-Sa'fid and His Majesty is
bound by the rules of the Sublime Shari'a.
Article Six. The [legal] judgments shall always be in
accordance with the Book of God, the Sunna of His Prophet
and what the companions and pious predecessors agreed
upon.132
Article Six is noteworthy because of its emphasis on the Qur'an
and the Sunna and its limitation of the scope of Ijna' (consensus)
to the "companions and the pious predecessors," the latter term
referring to the earliest generations of Islam before the
establishment of the schools of law. This term implies some
flexibility with regard to the binding authority of the medieval
legal texts, though the medieval texts have unquestionably exerted
a great deal of influence on the development of law in Saudi
Arabia.
Sheikh Yamani, the former Saudi minister of petroleum, drew a
132 The Organic Instructions of the Hiydz Kingdom pt. II, arts. 5, 6, translated in S.
SOLAIM, supra note 3, at 172.
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distinction between two definitions of the Shari'a in his 1978
speech at New York University. 133 Broadly defined, the Shari'a
consists of "everything written by Muslim jurists throughout the
centuries," but has no binding authority in and of itself because it
operated under circumstances that are no longer in existence.
Narrowly construed, "the Shafi'a is confined to the undoubted
principles of the Qur'An, what is true and valid of the Sunna, and
the consensus of the community represented by its scholars and
learned men during a certain period and regarding a particular
problem, provided there was such a consensus. Viewed as such,
the Shari'a has a binding authority on every Muslim ..... 134 Based
on this distinction, Yamani argues in favor of a broad legislative
power for Muslim governments to "select principles from the
various juristic schools without bias .... Such countries can then
legislate new solutions for novel problems by deriving the
solutions from the general principles of the Shari'a and
considerations of public interest and communal welfare." 135
This attitude is reflected to a somewhat lesser degree in the
rules governing Shari'a courts in Saudi Arabia. Judges are bound
to apply authoritative Hanbali texts, but are authorized to consult
opinions from the other schools and to apply them in
circumstances where the Hanbali opinion would "cause strain and
incompatibility with the public interest [maslahat al-'umUm]."136
Any such determination by a judge would be appealable to a
higher court and ultimately to the Judicial Council and the King.137
The existence of this legislative power to interpret the basic
sources of Shari'a afresh in light of modem circumstances explains
a great deal about the Regulation and Rules. Although the
Regulation and Rules are more comprehensive than anything in
the Shari'a manuals, the fundamental characteristics of tahkim that
distinguish it from arbitration are still present. Arbitration in
Saudi Arabia is to be arbitration in strict law. Arbitrators are
required to meet Shari'a qualifications and to render awards that
133 Yamani, The Eternal Shari'a, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 205 (1979) (remarks
delivered by Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources,
Saudi Arabia, at the New York University School of Law, New York, Oct. 24,
1978).
134 Id. at 206.
135 Id.
136 S. SOLAIM, supra note 3, at 96.
137 See id. at 94.
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follow the substantive provisions of the Shafi'a and the applicable
Saudi statutes. There are no express limitations on the scope of
judicial review to assure that these requirements are met. As we
have seen, these are requirements firmly grounded in the Qur'An
and the Sunna, inherent in the very nature of a divinely revealed,
religious law, which recognizes the authority of no human
judgment. For a judge to ratify an award that he believes to
contain a serious violation or misinterpretation of that law, would,
therefore, be nothing less than sinful.
The provisions of the Regulation and Rules that seem most
foreign to the Shari'a are the recognition of the validity of an
arbitration clause, and the Authority's power to appoint
arbitrators.138  As we have seen, these foreign elements are
counterbalanced to some undetermined degree by the requirement
that the parties submit a signed submission agreement for
validation by a judicial authority at the time a dispute arises.139
This is clearly a vestige of the Shari'a rule that a qadi had to
approve the appointment of a hakam in order to make the
appointment irrevocable.140 However, colorable arguments based
on Shari'a sources can be made in favor of arbitration clauses and
judicial appointment of arbitrators.141 Provided that a hakam is
competent and rules according to the Shari'a, it can be argued that
the "risk" otherwise present in an arbitration clause can be largely
eliminated by court supervision.142 A court can insure at the
beginning of the proceeding that a qualified hakam has been
chosen and can review his decision to insure compliance with the
Shari'a. The result should then be consistent with what a judge
138 See Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, arts. 1, 10.
139 Id. art. 5.
140 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
141 The mazAlim procedure provided for judicial appointment of arbitrators
without the approval of either of the disputing parties, even though that power
was extraordinary not to mention discretionary, as opposed to the "shall appoint"
language in art. 10. See supra note 69. Governmental boards such as the CSCD
are descendents of the old mazalim tribunals. As for Shari'a courts, Maliki
sources hold that qddis should be able to exercise mazalim powers when political
circumstances and the public interest require it. Tyan, supra note 105, at 260-61.
Taqi al-Din Abfi al-'Abbas Ibn Tamiyya (d.1328) was a leading Hanbali
advocate of the same doctrine of "political law" or "lawful public policy" (Al-
SiyAsa Al-Shar'iyya) which the Milikis used to justify the exercise of such powers.
AL-SIYA SA AL-SHAR'IYYA 182-83 (A. Farrukh trans. 1966) (PUBLIc POLICY IN
JURISPRUDENCE) [hereinafter PUBLIC POLICY].
142 Regarding the concept of risk (gharar), see supra note 110.
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would decide if there had been no tahkim. Even though such an
argument is novel, it is nevertheless consistent with Sheikh
Yamani's call for a fresh interpretation of the sources in light of
modern political realities.
Although Sheikh Yamani provides justification for a legislative
reinterpretation of the Shari'a, he does not provide a basis for
allowing any significant degree of deference to either judges or
arbitrators. If "considerations of public interest and communal
welfare" are to be the basis for reform, such considerations must
ultimately be the province of the central government, not of
arbitrators who are primarily concerned with the interest and
welfare of the business community rather than society as a whole
and who may not even be Saudi citizens.143
It is a difficult and controversial task to set the boundary line
where some current perception of the public interest becomes
inconsistent with fundamental principles stemming from the
primary sources of Islamic Law. This is one reason why Ibn
Taymiyya's famous treatise on political law, written in the early
fourteenth century, stresses the central role of consultation and
consensus between religious and political authorities.'" The rise of
the House of Sa'fid to dominance in what is now Saudi Arabia
began when they became allies of the seventeenth century religious
reformer 'Abd al-Wahhab. Early in this century King 'Abd al-'Aziz
exhibited considerable skill in taking disparate points, of view into
account and slowly building a consensus around the need for
reform and modernization. Though the process may seem slow to
foreigners, Saudi Arabia has come a long way since 1927, when
'Abd al-'Aziz and the 'Ulama' clashed over the legality of the
wireless transmitter under the Shari'a. 145
Arbitration represents a potential threat to this slow process of
consensus-building because it may lead to an uncontrolled and
haphazard introduction of foreign business customs and legal
principles that could cause confusion and resentment among
Saudis. 46 The Saudi reaction to the ARAMCO case 147 indicates
143 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
144 PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 141, at 182-83.
145 S. SOLAIM, supra note 3, at 159-70.
146 An historical precedent may be found in the granting of judicial privileges
to European and American nationals by the Ottoman Empire under the so-called
"Capitulations." Although initially intended only to allow the application of
foreign law in disputes among foreigners, the Capitulations eventually led to
widespread abuse involving the application of foreign laws to disputes involving
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that the Saudis have little confidence in the ability of foreigners,
especially non-Muslims, to apply correctly the Shari'a and to
identify the real differences between it and the general (mostly
Western) principles of international commercial law. This view
has been reinforced since then by the reluctance of arbitrators in
ICC arbitrations to attempt to apply Saudi law even where the
contract mandates its application and has been executed and
performed in Saudi Arabia. 48
Arbitration, as it is understood and practiced in the West, is
thus a suspect and dangerous institution from the point of view of
the Saudi government, because it threatens the government's
control over the pace of change, a key factor in the country's
political stability. Interestingly, there is a parallel between this
concern of the Saudi government to maintain control over changes
in their legal system and that of Muhammad during the earliest
days of Islam, when he denounced the pagan hakams as a threat to
the establishment of a new, unified legal and religious doctrine.
With all this in mind, the advantages and disadvantages of
arbitration in Saudi Arabia can be grouped according to the
rationales employed by businesspersons who resort to arbitration
in other countries: 49
0 Improving the administration of justice: Arbitration may or
may not be quicker and cheaper than litigation in Saudi Arabia.
There has always been strong pressure in the business community
in favor of voluntary compliance with arbitration awards, and that
pressure can only increase now that the Saudi government has
promulgated rules that give a new legitimacy to arbitration. The
Saudis hope that arbitration can help reduce the caseload of the
CSCD, thereby making both litigation and the review of arbitration
awards faster.150 If the CSCD remains overloaded, however, this
Muslim citizens of the Empire. These abuses caused considerable resentment, and
were a factor in the weakening of the Empire. Liebesny, The Development of
Western Judicial Privileges, 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 69, at 309, 312-15,
327-28.
147 27 I.L.R. 117 (1963); see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
148 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 13, at 197-99.
149 See supra text accompanying note 60.
150 If the Chambers of Commerce and Industry ("the Chambers") can be an
appointing authority under the new rules, this will further relieve the problems of
the CSCD. There seems to be no reason why parties cannot "otherwise agree" to
have the Chambers appoint arbitrators under the provisions of Article 10. See
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cannot help but affect the speed at which requests for enforcement
of, and objections against, arbitral awards can be decided. As
noted earlier, a party that wishes to take advantage of as many
opportunities for delay as possible would find ample opportunities
in the numerous possible referrals to the Authority possible under
the new rules. Finally, a degree of unpredictability is present
because of the lack of any defined standards for judicial review of
awards. There will frequently be no way of predicting whether a
magistrate reviewing an award will decide that an arbitrator has
violated and misinterpreted a rule of law stemming from the
Qur'in, the Sunna, or Ijma', if that is indeed the standard, because
the application of such rules to contemporary commercial
problems is simply not clear.151 Thus, parties will have to worry
about being sent back to square one with nothing to show for
going through an entire arbitration proceeding, especially if some
unusual or novel form of contract is at issue.
. The search for another justice: Arbitrators chosen will no
doubt frequently be Western-educated Muslims familiar with the
concerns of foreign businesspersons. However, these arbitrators
will have less discretion than arbitrators in other countries to
decide according to their own notions of what is in the best interest
of the business community. Arbitration in Saudi Arabia may have
some marginal value in bringing areas of Islamic law, where
differences may be found in the source material, into line with
prevailing business practices. However, arbitrators will always
have to keep in mind that their decisions must be acceptable to the
Authority originally competent to hear the dispute and to the
Authority's idea of what is best for the general welfare, which may
be based as much on political as legal concerns. Thus, to the extent
a businessperson is satisfied with the way judicial authorities
decide disputes in Saudi Arabia, he will be equally satisfied with
Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 10. However, it is hard to see how the
Chambers, which is not a judicial body and has no enforcement powers of its
own, can have any final authority to review arbitral awards. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
151 See N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 107. Because the scope and interaction
of Islamic and Western commercial law principles have in no way as yet been
fully elaborated or consistently defined in Saudi Arabia, it is futile to suppose that
any certitude exists at the moment as to what exactly Islamic commercial law is.
"There is no real law as such, but only law in the making: the state of flux and
speculation must be frankly recognized." Id.
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the way arbitrators decide them. To the extent he is dissatisfied
with the Saudi judiciary, arbitration is not likely to give him a great
deal more satisfaction. The same inconsistencies between Western
and Saudi law regarding creditor's rights, interest payments,
insurance and maintenance agreements, 152 the same ambiguities
with regard to copyrights and patents,153 and the contemporary
application of the traditional Islamic philosophy that a party whose
legitimate expectations are frustrated by unforeseen events may
withdraw from a contract, 5 4 will likely continue to exist whether
Saudi law is applied by a judge or an arbitrator.
. The search for conciliation: Contract law in Islam does
contain a number of doctrines that a Western lawyer would
classify as "equitable," although Islamic law would not distinguish
them from any other contract law doctrines. One of these is that
losses due to unforeseen events be born equally by the contracting
parties 55 Other equitable doctrines are clearly not recognized. For
example, damages could never include lost profits because these
are inherently uncertain. 156 In general, parties should expect no
more equity from an arbitrator than a court would be willing to
provide.
152 See Saba, supra note 2, at 19. "There is no clear right to repossess if a buyer
or lessee defaults and no clear definition of liability or enforceability of insurance
and maintenance obligations [under Saudi law]." Id.; see also N. COULSON, supra
note 102, at 94-99. Instead of earning interest on their money, lenders in Saudi
Arabia make, or intend to make, their profit from participation in commercial
ventures. This practice is undertaken to avoid the QUR'ANic injunction against
ribd' or "usury," and broad notions of illicit gain or unjustified profit.
153 Saba, supra note 2, at 19. In Saudi Arabia, "[platent laws do not exist and
copyrights are virtually unenforceable." Id.
154 See N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 82-93. "A brief summary, therefore, of
the traditional Shari'a doctrine of frustration is that virtually any supervening
circumstances which were unforeseen by the contracting party at the time of
agreement and which render performance more difficult and burdensome than
contemplated allow that contracting party who established the fact of such
'damage' to rescind the contract. The emphasis is upon the maxim of 'no fair loss'
in the performance of contractual obligations." Id. at 86.
155 See id. at 90. Coulson observed that Iraqi civil courts, when applying their
civil code to contracts frustrated by unforeseen events, would "split the loss
equally between contracting parties. 'Equity is equality' is a maxim deep-rooted
in Islamic legal tradition." Id. This theme, as applied to partnerships, is explored
at length in IBN TAYMIYYA, AL-MAZALIM AL-MUSHTARAKA (1972).
156 N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 82.
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* Resolution of disputes not within the jurisdiction of the courts:
An arbitrator, like a judge, might have authority to modify a
contract in response to unforeseen circumstances. However, a
contract that insufficiently outlines the rights and duties of the
parties in advance would run the risk of being declared void for
vagueness and uncertainty either by an arbitrator or a reviewing
court.
Arbitration in Saudi Arabia is therefore likely to suffer from the
unpredictability and ambiguity that afflict Saudi law in general.
As one commentator puts it: "it is futile to suppose that any
certitude exists at the moment as to what exactly Islamic
commercial law is. There is no real law as such, but only law in the
making: the state of flux and speculation must be frankly
recognized."157
5. AMICABLE COMPOSITION AND SULH
Article 16 of the Regulation 58 has attracted little attention
either in the Rules or from commentators, but it provides an
arbitration procedure that could avoid some of the predictability
inherent in the application of Saudi commercial law. It could also
result in awards that are easier to enforce than those reached
through arbitration in strict law. It appears to be analogous to the
tahkim procedure described in the Qur'an for settlement of
marriage disputes by two hakams, one appointed by the husband's
family and one by the wife's, authorized to reach a compromise
settlement. 5 9
This same procedure is applied to commercial disputes in a
code of Hanafi commercial law called the Majalla, published by the
Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.160 Each party appoints
an agent (Wakil) with power to settle the dispute. Any decision
reached by the two agents is binding on their principals. 161 In
contrast with the wide range of legal objections possible against an
award reached through regular tahkim procedures, authorized
commentators on the Majalla cite only two grounds on which a
reviewing court can overturn a settlement resulting from this sulh
157 Id. at 107.
158 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 16.
159 See supra note 88.
160 See the MAJALLA, supra note 105, art. 1847.
161 Id. art. 1556.
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procedure: (1) when it appears subsequently that the money paid
by a party to a sulh agreement was not due; and (2) when the
settlement concerns a claim that goods subject to a contract of sale
are defective, and the goods subsequently prove not to be
defective. 162 It should be noted that these grounds are factual,
rather than legal, in nature.
The Hanbali school also recognizes that a party may appoint an
agent to conclude a settlement with another party, and that the
settlement agreed to by the agent is binding on his principal.163
Therefore, there is no reason why the procedure outlined in the
Majalla would not also be possible in the Hanballi school. Article
16 of the Regulation appears expressly to adopt it, stating that
arbitrators may be authorized to conciliate (mufawwadin bi'l-
Sulh), in which case their decision must be unanimous.64
Apparently Article 4, mandating that an uneven number of
arbitrators be appointed,165 would still be applicable. The extra
arbitrator would presumably act as a mediator to help the two
party-appointed arbitrators reach an agreement. If he failed to do
so, the panel could then proceed to decide the case in strict law by
majority vote.166 Since Article 16 consistently refers to arbitrators
in the plural, it seems that the parties could not authorize a sole
arbitrator to conciliate. 167
Based on Hanbali statements regarding sulh,168 a settlement
162 S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 81-82.
163 4 IBN QUDAMA, supra note 103, at 359-60.
164 See Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 16.
165 Id. art. 4; see also Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 22. "The requirement of
an uneven number of arbitrators [in Article 4] deviates from the method set forth
in the Labor and Workman Law of 1969 which provides for two arbitrators and an
umpire." Id.
166 See Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, arts. 4, 16; see also Van den Berg,
supra note 14, at 28. The expression "authorized to reach a compromise solution"
in Article 16 means that the arbitrators act as conciliators and give a binding
decision with the concurrence of the parties. This is why there must be unanimity
in this case. Without the authority to compromise or with an inability to be
unanimous, arbitrators will reach a majority decision based upon strict law;
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 118, at 72 (appointment of odd number of arbitrators).
167 See Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 16; see also Van den Berg, supra
note 14, at 22. "Although the appointment of a sole arbitrator (usually a Saudi
lawyer) by mutual agreement of the parties enjoys popularity, the most common
method of appointing arbitrators is that each party appoints an arbitrator and that
the two so nominated appoint a third arbitrator who is the presiding arbitrator."
Id.
168 See 4 IBN QUDAMA, supra note 103, at 357 passim.
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reached through this procedure would be more difficult to attack
on appeal than would an award reached through arbitration in
strict law. The former would be treated as if it were a binding
(Lazim) contract agreed to by both parties, while the latter would
be treated like a judgment.' 69 While a judgment establishes the
rights and duties of the parties under their original contract, and
can be attacked on the basis that it misinterpreted that contract,170 a
settlement constitutes a new contract to be judged as valid or
invalid on its own merits.17' Thus, a settlement is valid as long as it
does not require the parties to do something they could not have
contracted to do themselves. There is thus no need to establish
what the rights and duties of the parties in fact were under the
contract they actually signed.172
This procedure, which appears to have much in common with
the Roman law concept of amicable composition,173 might prove
very useful in long-term leasing, supply, maintenance, and service
contracts, which the Shari'a would classify under the general
heading of hire (Ijara), which includes disputes which arise out of
unanticipated needs and costs, and disagreements over the quality
of services or equipment supplied. In such disputes, some sort of
modification of contractual terms to respond to changed
circumstances may be preferable to finding default, which is likely
to end the business relationship between the parties. It is these
long-term contracts that are the most difficult to enforce under
Saudi law because of their uncertainty and inherent risk. If the
parties to these long-term contracts want to continue to do
business with one another, sulh may be a far better method of
repairing their relationship than either arbitration or litigation. An
American businessman speaking at a recent symposium on
arbitration and conciliation in the Middle East advocated just such
a procedure:
My own feeling is that one should try to reach a settlement
without arbitration or without litigation. In order to do
this, it is sometimes necessary to try to eliminate those
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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people whose egos have been involved in the execution of
the contract, bringing in some new people from both sides
who might be a little more unbiased about reaching a
settlement. I have found that when you go to arbitration
there are inflated claims and counterclaims and finally, if a
settlement is reached before the tribunal rules, the
settlement is about what could have been negotiated in the
first place. 74
Most important, sulh is an unquestionably Islamic institution,
the Prophet's preferred method of dispute resolution. 175 There is
considerable pressure today in Saudi Arabia to reach and abide by
amicable settlements.176 Indeed, the main value of tahkim, in the
minds of the medieval Shari'a scholars, was probably that it would
likely produce a settlement of the dispute rather than a
judgment.177 That value, it is submitted, is why the procedure was
supposed to remain voluntary until the hakam reached his
decision, according to the doctrine of three of the four schools.
The possibility of judgment, whether by the hakam or a qddi, or
both, was left open mainly to spur the parties to reach an agreed
settlement. It may have been considered desirable for a hakam's
judgment to be difficult to enforce, because this would constitute
added incentive for the parties to settle.
Sulh will certainly not be an appropriate procedure in all cases.
Where there has been a complete failure to perform the contract, or
where one party has not acted in good faith, there is no business
relationship to maintain and proceedings aimed at reaching a
settlement would constitute merely another opportunity for the
defendant to delay the ultimate resolution of the dispute.
Similarly, where the positions of the parties are very far apart, it
will not likely be possible to find any solution on which all the
arbitrators can agree.
The decision whether to authorize the arbitrators to conciliate
under Article 16 should therefore not be made in the arbitration
clause, but after the dispute arises, based on the parties' assessment
174 M. BROOKS, PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIUM ON U.S.-ARAB COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 40 (1984).
175 See id.
176 Id.
17 Id.; see also N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 87.
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of whether a compromise would be an appropriate or feasible
solution to the dispute. Nonetheless, counsel for foreign
companies should keep in mind that sulh is the most Islamic, least
controversial means of dispute resolution in Saudi Arabia.
Although it may preclude total victory, the re-suit is likely to be
agreeable to both parties. The procedure outlined in Article 16 of
the Regulation should, therefore, attract more interest than it has
thus far. The Saudi government should be urged to issue rules to
define more completely the consequences of authorizing
arbitrators to conciliate.
6. CONCLUSION
Increased use of procedures that are drawn from the rich
legacy of Shari'a scholarship is likely to be a far more effective way
of helping the Saudi legal system develop in ways acceptable to
foreign business people than are continued attempts to pressure
the Saudi government to adopt laws that are essentially foreign.
Rather than pushing for rules that limit the scope of court review
of arbitration awards, Western lawyers should be aware that a
procedure already exists for doing so in appropriate cases.
In general, the Arbitration Regulation of 1983178 will be a
success if those who utilize its procedures do not try to make it into
a vehicle for wholesale change. Awards that pay only lip service to
the Shari'a will likely be overturned by judicial authorities,
resulting in a great deal of frustration on all sides. Skillful
arbitrators and parties perceptive enough to choose the
appropriate procedure (and the appropriate arbitrator) for the case,
can play an important role in the slow process of discovering a
workable application of the Shari'a to the commercial realities of
the twentieth century.
178 See Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 1.
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ARBITRATION REGULATION OF SAUDI ARABIA
Royal Decree M/46 of 12.07.1403H (25.04.1983G)
Article I
The parties may agree to arbitrate a specific existing dispute; a
prior agreement may also be made in respect of any dispute
resulting from the performance of a specific contract.
Article 2
Arbitration shall not be permitted in cases where a settlement
(Arabic: SULH) is not allowed. An agreement to arbitrate (Arabic:
AL-ITTIFAQ 'ALA AL-TAHKIM) may not be made except by
those who have capacity to act.
Article 3
Government Agencies are not allowed to resort to arbitration for
settlement of their disputes with third parties except after having
obtained the consent of the President of the Council of Ministers.
This ruling may be amended by resolution of the Council of
Ministers.
Article 4
The arbitrator shall have expertise and be of good conduct and
behavior, and shall have full legal capacity. If there are several
arbitrators, their number shall be uneven.
Article 5
The parties to the dispute shall file the arbitration instrument
(Arabic: WATHIQAT AL-TAHKIM) with the Authority originally
competent to hear the dispute. The instrument shall be signed by
the parties or their authorized attorneys, and by the arbitrators,
and it must state the details of the dispute, the names of the
arbitrators and their acceptance to hear the dispute. Copies of the
documents relating to the dispute shall be attached.
Article 6
The Authority originally competent to hear the dispute shall record
the applications for arbitration submitted to it, and take a decision
approving the arbitration instrument (Arabic: WATHIQAT AL-
TAHKIM).
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Article 7
If the parties have agreed to arbitrate before the occurrence of the
dispute, or if the arbitration instrument relating to a specific
existing dispute has been approved, then the subject matter of the
dispute shall be heard only according to the provisions of this
Regulation.
Article 8
The clerk of the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute
shall be in charge of all the notifications and notices provided for in
this Regulation.
Article 9
The arbitrator's decision shall be taken within the time limit
specified in the arbitration instrument (Arabic: WATHIQAT AL-
TAHKIM), unless it is agreed to extend it. If the parties have not
fixed in the arbitration instrument a time limit for the decision, the
arbitrators shall take their decision within ninety days from the
date on which the arbitration instrument was approved; otherwise
any of the parties may, if he so desires, appeal to the Authority
originally competent to hear the dispute which shall decide either
hearing the subject matter or extending the time limit for another
period.
Article 10
If the parties have not appointed the arbitrators, or if either of them
fails to appoint his arbitrator(s), or if one or more of the arbitrators
refuses to assume his task or withdraws, or something prevents
him from carrying out his tasks, or if he is dismissed, and there is
no special agreement between the parties, the Authority originally
competent to hear the dispute shall appoint the required
arbitrators upon the request of the party who is interested in
expediting the arbitration, in the presence of the other party or in
his absence after being summoned to a meeting to be held for this
purpose. The Authority shall appoint as many arbitrators as are
necessary to complete the total number of arbitrators agreed to by
the parties; the decision taken in this respect shall be final.
Article 11
The arbitrator may not be removed except with the mutual consent
of the parties, and the arbitrator so removed may claim
compensation if he had already proceeded and if he had not been
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the cause of such removal. Furthermore, he cannot be removed
except for reasons that occur or appear after the filing of the
arbitration instrument (Arabic: WATHIQAT AL-TAHKIM).
Article 12
The arbitrator may be challenged for the same reasons for which a
judge may be challenged. The request for challenge shall be
submitted to the Authority originally competent to hear the
dispute within five days from the day on which the party was
notified of the appointment of the arbitrator, or the day on which
one of the reasons for challenge appeared or occurred. The
decision on the request for challenge shall be taken in a meeting to
be held for this purpose and attended by the parties and the
arbitrator whose challenge is requested.
Article 13
The arbitration shall not terminate because of the death of one of
the parties, but the time fixed for the award shall be extended by
thirty days unless the arbitrators decide on a further extension.
Article 14
If an arbitrator is appointed in place of the removed arbitrator or
the one who has withdrawn, the date fixed for the award shall be
extended by thirty days.
Article 15
The arbitrators, by the majority by which the award shall be made,
may, through a justified decision, extend the periods fixed for the
award on account of circumstances pertaining to the subject matter
of the dispute.
Article 16
The decision of the arbitrators shall be taken by a majority vote and
if they are authorized to reach a compromise solution (Arabic:
SULH), their decision shall be by unanimity.
Article 17
The award document shall especially include the arbitration
instrument (Arabic: WATHIQAT AL-TAHKIM), a resume of the
depositions of the parties and their documents, reasons for the
award and its text and date, and the signatures of the arbitrators.
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If one or more of them refuse to sign the award, such refusal shall
be stated in the award document.
Article 18
All awards issued by the arbitrators, even if they are issued in
relation to one of the procedures of investigation, shall be filed
within five days with the Authority originally competent to hear
the dispute and the parties shall be notified by copies of them. The
parties may submit their objections against what is issued by the
arbitrators to the Authority with whom the awards were filed,
within fifteen days from the date on which they were notified of
the arbitrators' awards; otherwise such awards shall be final.
Article 19
If the parties or one of them submitted an objection against the
award of the arbitrators within the period provided for in the
preceding Article, the Authority originally competent to hear the
dispute shall consider the dispute and shall either dismiss the
objection and issue an order for execution of the award, or accept
the objection and decide the case.
Article 20
The award of the arbitrators shall be due for execution, when it
becomes final, by an order from the Authority originally
competent to hear the dispute. This order shall be issued upon
request of one of the concerned parties after confirming that there
is nothing to prevent its execution legally.
Article 21
The award made by the arbitrators shall be considered, after
issuance of the order or execution in accordance with the previous
Article, as effective as a judgment made by the Authority which
issued the order of execution.
Article 22
Fees of the arbitrators shall be determined by agreement between
the parties and unpaid sums of such fees shall be deposited with
the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute within five
days after approval of the arbitration instrument (Arabic:
WATHIQAT AL-TAHKIM), and shall be paid within a week from
the date on which the order for execution of award is issued.
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Article 23
If there is no agreement of the fees of the arbitrators, and a dispute
ensues, the matter shall be settled by the Authority originally
competent to hear the dispute, which decision shall be final.
Article 24
The decisions required for the execution of this Regulation shall be
issued by the President of the Council of Ministers, on the basis of
a proposal made by the Minister of Justice after agreement with the
Minister of Commerce and the President of the Board of
Grievances.
Article 25
This Regulation shall be published in the Official Gazette; and shall
be effective thirty days after the date of its publication.
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GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS
ALLAH: God.
BATIL: Null and void.
DAR AL-HARB: Lit. "Territory of War." Territory under control of
non-Muslims.
DHIMMY: A non-Muslim residing permanently in a Muslim
country under the protection of the Muslim government.
FATWA: A legal opinion given by a legal advisor, or MUFrI.
FIQH: The science of SHARI'A jurisprudence.
GHARAR: Risk of uncompensated loss to one party to a contract
and corresponding gain to the other due to uncertainty of
contractual obligations or unforeseen circumstances.
HADITH: An anecdote recording an action or statement of the
Prophet, his companions (SAHABA) or immediate successors
(TAB'ION). A HADITH consists of an account of the action or
statement (MATN) and a list of names of the persons who
transmitted orally up to the time it was first recorded in writing
(ISNAD), ending with the name of an eyewitness to the event or
statement.
HAKAM: Arbitrator.
IJARA: Hire or lease. Generally, any contract transferring the use
and benefit of an object or person for a limited period of time for
consideration.
IJMA': Consensus of scholars and leading men of a certain past
epoch regarding a point of law. One of the four main sources of
Islamic jurisprudence (usUL AL-FIQH).
IKHTILAF AL-RA'Y: A difference of opinion regarding a point of law
on which there is no consensus among the four schools.
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JA'IZ: Permissible. An adjective applied to contracts of license such
as agency or partnership that were revocable at any time by either
party.
KAHIN: A soothsayer.
LAZIM: Binding, enforceable.
MADHHAB: Opinion or school of law.
MAJALLA, the: A code of commercial law published by the
Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century based on the teachings
of the Hanafi school.
MASLAHAT AL-' umJM: The public welfare.
MAYSIR: A game of chance played in pre-Islamic Arabia outlawed
by the Prophet. Gambling, in general.
MAZALIM: P1. of MAZLAMA, a grievance or injustice. Refers to a
special legal procedure invoking the direct authority of the
sovereign to review all judgments and right all wrongs without
being bound by SHARI'A rules of procedure or evidence.
MUFAWWADIN BI'L SULH: Persons appointed by the parties to a
dispute authorized to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute.
MUFTI: A legal advisor authorized to issue FATWAS.
MUHAKKAM: An arbitrator, synonymous with HAKAM.
NA'IB: A representative, delegate, or deputy.
AL-QADA': Judicial procedure, the administration of justice.
QAD: A judge, magistrate.
QIYAS: Analogy, one of the four main sources of the SHARI'A.
QUR'AN: The Holy Book of Islam, believed to be authored by God
Himself. The most important source of Islamic jurisprudence.
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RIBA': Usury, interest.
SHAR'AN: According to SHARi'A.
SHARi'A: Literally, "a clear path to water." Islamic Law as derived
from the QUR'AN and the SUNNA of the Prophet through IJMA',
QiYAS and the public interest considerations. It purports to
regulate all aspects of the life of a devout Muslim.
SHi'A: Literally, a party, faction, or sect. Refers to the party of Ali,
the fourth Khalif, to whom the SHI'I sect traces its origin, and to
whose descendants SHi'i Muslims attach special importance.
SULH: Amicable settlement, conciliation.
SULTAN: The sovereign of the Muslim state.
SUNNA: Practice. The SUNNA of the Prophet is one of the four
main sources of Islamic Law. The SUNNA of his companions and
immediate successors, where they agreed, constitutes the most
binding form of IJMA'.
SUNNI: Pertaining to orthodox Islam, as opposed to, for example,
the SHYi sect. The schools of law discussed in this paper are those
accepted by all orthodox, SUNNI Muslims, who consider that all
four schools provide acceptable interpretations of the SHARi'A.
TAHKiM: Arbitration.
WAKiL: Agent.
WASATA: Mediation.
WATHIQAT AL-TAHKIM: Arbitration instrument or document. An
agreement to submit a specific existing dispute to Arbitration
under the 1983 Saudi Arbitration Regulation.
WIKALA: Agency.
'ULAMA': P1. of 'ALIM, wise man, expert, scientist. Refers here to
legal and religious scholars of the SHARi'A.
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